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This paper argues that the cause of Japan’s stagnation in the 1990s was not inefficient 
corporations, a failure to implement adequate reforms, or bad macroeconomic policy.  The 
problem was more fundamental:  a structural inadequacy of aggregate demand.   By the middle 
1980s Japan was approaching economic maturity, and its savings rate should have fallen as 
consumption replaced private non-residential investment as a source of new demand.  
Demographic factors, however, prevented this adjustment from taking place.   Much of the 
population was now entering middle age, the stage of life in which people everywhere increase 
their savings in order to prepare for the exigencies of retirement.  The behavior of these older 
people kept the savings rate elevated long past the point where such elevation was helpful; and 
the country consequently suffered from a surfeit of capital which, if not absorbed by some sector 
of the economy, might well have pushed it into a prolonged recession or even a depression.  
 
The most obvious way to resolve this imbalance would have been to ship the excess funds 
abroad through a much larger current account surplus.  The government, however, could not 
weaken the yen in order to produce this effect because Japan’s trading partners were complaining 
that it was already exporting too much and, perhaps paradoxically, because important domestic 
interest groups were also opposed to a policy of aggressive depreciation.  Political considerations 
likewise prevented the government from enacting structural reforms that might have lowered the 
savings rate, as is evident in this paper’s review of conditions both in the overall economy and in 
the automobile, retail, banking, and construction industries.  By default, then, Japan was forced 
to rely on a combination of excessive corporate investment and ever larger government budget 
deficits as a means of employing capital and forestalling recession.  This strategy cannot be 
adjudged a complete failure, for it bolstered demand and enabled the country to achieve GDP 
growth of some 1% per annum.  But it was certainly suboptimal, leaving the economy highly 
inefficient and causing the national debt to increase dramatically.  Japan would therefore have 
fewer resources with which to remedy its profound structural distortions when it finally 








Among those who provided information and advice in the writing of this paper are Robert 
Aliber, Jennifer Amyx, David Atkinson, Brendan Brown, James Fiorillo, Hidetaka Fukuda, 
Richard Jerram, Paul Hewitt, Richard Katz, Akira Kojima, Ronald MacKinnon, Kathy Matsui, 
Yukihiro Moroe, Tadashi Nakamae, Marcus Noland, Daniel Okimoto, Hugh Patrick, Adam 
Posen, Takamitsu Saito, Tomoko Saito, Hiromichi Shirakawa, Yves Tiberghian, Maria Toyoda, 





In the late 1980s many observers regarded Japan's economy as "miraculous", capable of 
sustaining high levels of economic growth and employment over many decades and perhaps 
indefinitely.  During these years Western universities offered courses on Japanese business 
practices and pundits published countless books purporting to reveal the wellsprings of the 
country's prosperity.  Soon, however, the tenor of the discourse changed.  During the 1990s 
Japan’s growth rate fell to an average of only one percent per annum and the country 
experienced two outright recessions.  The costs of this slowdown were immense, including the 
forgoing of considerable potential wealth, damage to the country’s social fabric, erosion of 
public confidence in the government, and years of intense international criticism. Japan thus 
entered the 21st century considerably poorer and weaker than had seemed likely just a decade 
before. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explain how this reversal of fortunes occurred.  Namely, what 
forces caused Japan's economic performance to deteriorate so markedly in the 1990s, and why 
did those forces remain virulent for such a long time?  To answer these questions, the paper 
examines the country’s fundamental problem of inadequate aggregate demand, the relationship 
between that phenomenon and the "bubble" which inflated in Japan’s various asset markets 
during the late 1980s, and the effects of these two phenomena on the industrial and banking 
systems.  It then evaluates the government's efforts to reinvigorate the economy.  The conclusion 
to which the analysis leads is that Japan's most powerful economic actors—political leaders, civil 
servants, bank managers, and corporate executives—never sincerely tried to cure the country of 
its malady.  Fearing the implications of the necessary reforms for their own parochial interests, 
those people effectively opted to sustain the status quo no matter what the cost to the nation as a 
whole.  So while it is true that political factors did not cause Japan’s malaise, they definitely 





 Part One: The Burdens of History
   
Every economic system is unique, embodying the universal mechanisms that create jobs and 
produce wealth but also any number of unique cultural characteristics and historical influences.  
To the extent that these idiosyncratic traits depart from the principles of textbook economics, 
they usually introduce industrial and financial inefficiencies that retard a country’s material 
progress.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s Japan was widely perceived as an exception to this 
rule; during these years many commentators believed that the country's peculiarities represented 
an empirical breakthrough toward greater productivity, profitability, and growth.  In its extreme 
form this theory posited that Japan had evolved a superior form of capitalism that would gain 
universal respect once some theorist—an Asian Adam Smith, it was said—had elucidated its 
workings.1  From today's perspective, however, these conjectures appear largely fallacious.  
Many of Japan's distinctive attributes were in fact symptomatic of an ailment which ultimately 
transformed the country from an object of international emulation into a cautionary example of 
deflation, official profligacy, and political dysfunction. 
 
That severe distortions were present in the economy was not obvious until quite recently.  From 
the 1950s through the early 1970s Japan evolved much as other parts of Asia would later do. In 
these decades a large number of people migrated from the countryside to the cities, providing a 
more or less constant stream of workers to support industrial expansion.2  The supply of credit 
likewise increased fast during this period, for government policy reinforced a popular 
predisposition toward frugality and kept interest rates lower than they would otherwise have 
been.  This, in turn, facilitated a great deal of capital spending.  Gross capital formation—
meaning the sum of government, corporate, and housing investment—rose in real terms from 
13.1% of GDP in 1955 to a peak of 32.8% in 1973.  This was a very high level, to be sure, but it 
                                                 
1 Interviews with officials in the Economic Planning Agency by the author, February 1992. Eisuke Sakakibara, 
Beyond Capitalism: The Japanese Model of Market Economics (New York: Economic Strategy Institute, 1993), p. 
2.  
2 Kent Calder, Crisis and Compensation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 172.   
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was appropriate for a developing country with an insufficient stock of plant and equipment.3  
During this period Japan also enjoyed easy access to advanced Western technologies through 
trade, licensing agreements, and other media of exchange.  The combination of these 
sophisticated technologies with the country's abundant savings and labor proved a potent mix: 
from 1955 to 1973, its GDP grew at an average real rate of just over 9% per annum.  South 
Korea, Taiwan, and other East Asian countries would later demonstrate comparably rapid 
modernization, but Japan remained the single big economy to achieve such a feat. 
 
At some point, though, the Japanese economy should have gone through a structural change in 
which the balance of commercial activity shifted away from investment and towards 
consumption.  There were two reasons for this.  First, by the early 1970s rural Japan had shed 
most of its surplus labor, and wages in industrial centers were beginning to rise.4  As 
corporations’ payroll obligations grew more onerous, the number of potential investments that 
would yield more revenue than they cost decreased.  Firms’ investment budgets should 
accordingly have begun to shrink. The second reason that Japanese corporations should have 
become more conservative was the country's attainment, sometime in the late 1970s or early 
1980s, of the global technological frontier as defined by the United States, Germany, and other 
mature economies.5  Having adopted most of the world's best commercial ideas and production 
techniques, Japan could no longer create new industries through mere imitation: its enterprises 
must now devote more time and money to the incremental improvement of existing goods and 
services and to the invention of entirely new products.  Technological progress would 
consequently become slower and more expensive and, again, the scope for profitable investment 
would narrow.   Confronted by these two trends, Japanese corporations should have curtailed 
their capital expenditures and started returning more of their earnings to workers through better 
salaries, and to shareholders through more generous dividends.  The household sector’s share of 
national income would then rise, and people would be able to reach their financial goals even as 
                                                 
3 This paragraph relies on the national accounts in 68SNA, published by the Cabinet Office’s Economic and Social 
Research Institute (ESRI), which employs a price index based on 1990 prices and extends back to 1955. The figures 
used in the rest of this paper are from 93SNA, which is indexed to 1995 prices and reaches back to 1980. 
4 Richard Katz, Japan: The System that Soured (Armonk, NY:  ME Sharpe, 1998), pp. 206-10. Brendan Brown, The 
Yo-Yo Yen and the Future of the Japanese Economy (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 63-5. 
5 Compare: Porter et al., pp. 16,118; Mikitani, “The Facts”, in Ryoichi Mikitani and Adam S. Posen, ed., Japan’s 
Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to US Experience (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 
pp. 29,31; Katz, pp. 131-8; and Brown, pp. 64-5. 
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they spent more money on material comforts.  Consumption would thus come to replace capital 
spending as a source of marginal aggregate demand, and GDP would continue growing at a 
respectable, if somewhat slower, pace. 
  
In the event, politics interrupted this process of structural maturation.  By the early 1970s 
agriculture, small businesses, and some of the other groups on which the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) had historically depended for donations and electoral assistance were 
beginning to decline.6  The Oil Crisis of 1973-1974 exacerbated this difficulty by causing energy 
prices to surge in a manner which threatened broad swathes of corporate Japan.  Rather than 
allow these forces to thin the ranks of its supporters, the LDP pursued a dual strategy of shielding 
its existing friends from market forces even as it extended its patronage to a range of new 
industries.  Among the tactics employed in these efforts were subsidized loans through the 
official budget; generous grants for research and development which, in effect, sheltered 
companies from competition; and the organization of formal and informal cartels in parts of the 
economy that suffered from excess capacity or especially intense competition.7  Yet another 
tactic was increasing the size of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP), a sort of 
unofficial “second budget” over which the elected authorities had more control than the regular 
budget and which they routinely used to reward favored companies and industrial groups.8  
During the 1970s and 1980s, furthermore, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) continued to depress 
interest rates and obliged commercial banks to channel credit into sectors that tended to 
sympathize with the ruling party. So even as some industries were undergoing deregulation and 
reform, in many other areas a "hidden . . . safety net" was being "built into the structure of the 
private political economy” in order to protect the Liberal Democrats and their corporate allies.9   
 
                                                 
6 Calder, pp. 104-9,174-5.   
7 C. Fred Bergsten, Takatoshi Ito, and Marcus Noland, No More Bashing (Washington, DC: IIE, 2002), pp. 
131,142,144-9. Akiyoshi Horiuchi, "The Big Bang: Idea and Reality," in Takeo Hoshi and Hugh Patrick, ed., Crisis 
and Change in the Japanese Financial System (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 236. Yoshinori 
Shimizu, "Convoy Regulation, Bank Management, and the Financial Crisis in Japan", in Mikitani and Posen, pp. 58-
60. Calder, pp. 155-7.   
8 Maria Toyoda, Why Thinking Globally Makes It Difficult to Act Locally (and Vice Versa): The Political 
Economics of Financial Liberalization and National Elections (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1998), 
pp. 82-4,86,94,165. 
9 Katz. p. 105; also pp. 45,82-3,86-96,157-60,166-9,170-7,179-95. Calder, pp. 112-4,124,156-7,160-
1,163,166,172,175-9,231. Horiuchi, p. 236, likewise describes the financial system as a “safety net”.  
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Whether or not this was a nefarious arrangement depends on one’s point of view.  On the one 
hand the cost of subsidizing weak enterprises was tolerable as long as the economy was growing 
fast, and few people were upset by marginal sacrifices made in the name of social stability.  
Indeed, those many Japanese citizens who appreciated political quiescence and high levels of 
employment might well have approved of the new emphasis even if they clearly recognized its 
costs.  In this sense the widening of the LDP’s electoral base to include ever more parts of the 
economy could be portrayed as a reasonable distributive outcome rather than just a cynical 
political maneuver.10  On the other hand, over time Japan would pay a steep price for its system 
of disguised protectionism and the benefits it conferred.  This is evident in two related 
phenomena:  the country’s worsening industrial inefficiency, and a savings rate that stayed 
elevated long past the stage at which such elevation was helpful.   
 
[Chart 1:  Japan's Dual Economy] 
 
In the industrial economy, the effect of intimate cooperation between the LDP, the bureaucracy, 
and much of the business community was consistently to vitiate the market forces that might 
have redirected resources from feckless enterprises to more profitable and expansive ones.  The 
result was the gradual emergence of what Michael Porter and others have termed "two Japans”.  
The more impressive of these comprised those manufacturers and exporters that competed in 
global markets and hence were compelled to meet, or exceed, international standards of 
excellence.11  Many of these still number among the world’s most renowned corporations.  The 
weaker “Japan”, by contrast, included such domestic industries as "retailing, wholesaling, 
transportation and logistics, construction, energy, health care services, and food preparation" as 
well as the banking and securities sectors.  Reclining upon the “hidden safety net”, these 
predominantly “non-tradable” industries were able to survive, and in many cases prosper, even 
though they were often extremely irresponsible in their use of labor and capital.  This 
misallocation of resources was in fact a grave problem.  Not only did it undermine the 
                                                 
10 Calder, pp. 155-7.  Also, Sakakibara, Beyond Capitalism, p. 2; and Adam S. Posen, Restoring Japan's Economic 
Growth, (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1998), pp. 33-4. 
11 Michael Porter, Hirotaka Takeuchi, and Mariko Sakakibara, Can Japan Compete? (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 
2000), p. 6; see also pp. 23-6,34-65,11-6. Compare McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), Manufacturing Productivity, 
(Washington, DC: MGI, 1993), Executive Summary, pp. 1-2; and Why the Japanese Economy Is Not Growing:  
Micro Barriers to Productivity Growth, (MGI: July 2000), Executive Summary, p. 1, and Synthesis, p. 30. 
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profitability of the backward reaches of the economy, but it also harmed Japan’s most successful 
firms.  For while the country’s best enterprises were largely global in orientation and 
competence, geography compelled them to procure many of their supplies from local companies 
at prices that were well above than those which prevailed abroad.12  Thus the inefficient “Japan” 
impaired the performance of the efficient one and dragged down the productivity of the entire 
economy. 
 
Coincident with, and essential to, this progressive distortion of the Japanese industrial system 
was the country’s stubbornly high private savings rate.  This feature of the economy arose from 
decisions made independently by both corporations and households.    Among the many factors 
that companies consider in deciding how much of their earnings to save are the range of 
available investment opportunities, the size and variability of their own income flows, and the 
costs of raising capital from external sources. But the mechanisms of corporate governance are 
also important, for if they function poorly firms will feel less pressure to disgorge their surplus 
funds to shareholders.  Instead, they may squander their cash on wasteful internal projects, 
deposit it in bank accounts, or use it to speculate in equities, bonds, and real estate.  In the United 
States and some European countries, firms with large stocks of such assets would be subject to 
intense shareholder criticism and perhaps to hostile takeovers by outside investors who reckoned 
that the money could be used to greater advantage elsewhere.  In Japan, however, the "main 
bank" system, ubiquitous webs of interlocking shareholdings, and the government’s 
predisposition to protect wasteful corporations and their managers meant that market discipline 
was not very strict.13  There was nothing, in short, to stop companies from hoarding their 
earnings.  So rather than falling as the Japanese economy matured and the expected profitability 
of potential investments decreased, the corporate rate of savings remained buoyant.  Indeed, in 
many years businesses were basically self-financing and did not need to borrow from the 
household sector at all. 
 
[Chart 2: Sources of Savings.] 
                                                 
12 Katz, pp. 47-8,189,196. Bergsten et al., pp. 116-7.  Porter et al., p. 12.  This remained true through the early 
2000s. Nikkei Weekly, 13 August 2001.   
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 A different set of variables determines a country’s household savings rate.  Nationality may be 
significant in this regard, for in certain periods some peoples exhibit more parsimony than others.  
A society’s level of economic development also plays a role.  For whereas the citizens of less 
developed countries often save a high proportion of their income in order to exploit the rich 
investment opportunities they enjoy, workers and investors in fully industrialized economies 
have fewer such opportunities and so tend to save less.  In Japan’s case, though, the critical 
factors were the unique attributes described above:  namely, demographics and the insidious 
effects of the “hidden safety net”.  According to the “lifecycle hypothesis” of financial behavior, 
which is empirically valid across most countries, people’s savings rates vary with their ages.14  
Young people and new families generally spend more on food, clothing, housing, and education 
than they earn, so their savings rate is negative.  The Middle-aged, meanwhile, typically earn 
more as a group than they immediately require and so are able to put aside considerable sums of 
money in preparation for the exigencies of retirement; this group is usually a country’s most 
sedulous savers.  Once those workers quit their jobs and join the ranks of the retired, however, 
their income drops off precipitously and they begin “dissaving”, or running down their 
accumulated wealth.  All other things being equal, then, a country’s household savings rate will 
be low if its population is disproportionately young or old, and high if a large percentage of its 
citizenry is middle-aged. 
 
[Chart 3: comparative savings] 
 
This analysis explains much of what happened in Japan.  In the 1970s the household savings rate 
started to decline, as one would expect of a largely industrialized country that was approaching 
the technological frontier.  But then demographic realities intervened.  Over the next two decades 
the number of people in the most provident age bracket—those who were 45 to 60 years old—
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Bruce Stokes, A New Beginning:  Recasting the US-Japan Economic Relationship (New York:  Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2000), pp. 63-4.  Also, Takeo Hoshi and Hugh Patrick, “The Japanese Financial System:  An 
Introductory Overview”, in Hoshi and Patrick, p. 7; and Mikitani, “The Facts”, p. 29. 
14 MGI, The Global Capital Market: Supply, Demand, Pricing, and Allocation (Washington, DC: MGI, 1994), 
Chapter 3, pp. 4-8. 
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surged by an enormous 42.1%.15  This remarkable change implied that the Japanese household 
sector would persist in saving more, and consuming less, than would normally be the case for so 
fully developed an economy.  The demographic trend will reverse early in the 21st century, when 
those many middle-aged workers leave the labor force and begin spending the wealth which they 
have so assiduously acquired, but the effect of their actions during the period discussed in this 
paper was to keep Japan awash in private-sector capital.16
 
The “hidden safety net” underscored this phenomenon.  People save money for specific 
purposes: to purchase homes, for instance, to finance children’s educations, or to facilitate 
comfortable retirement.  Explicitly or implicitly, individuals have targets for how much money 
they will need to attain these goals.  It follows, therefore, that anything that retards the speed 
with which households grow more affluent will compel them to save more of their income over a 
longer period of time than they would otherwise choose to do.  The “hidden safety net” had 
precisely this effect.  In part because of official regulation, the real interest rate earned on bank 
deposits from the 1950s through the 1980s was exceedingly low—as, incidentally, were the 
returns offered by the postal savings system, which was itself essentially a huge public bank.17 In 
addition, the government’s policy of cosseting troubled companies through the provision of 
cheap credit and other forms of assistance enabled those firms to stay in business, where they 
monopolized labor and capital that should ideally have been redeployed to more productive uses.  
So corporate profitability worsened, and the returns households earned on their stock and bond 
portfolios were pushed down to levels much lower than in comparably sophisticated 
economies.18  The situation improved slightly during the collective transport of the late 1980s, 
but then deteriorated precipitously when the asset bubble burst in the early 1990s.19   The losses 
                                                 
15 More precisely, the change occurred between 1980 and 2000.  UN Population Division, World Population Trends, 
2000 Revision.  
16 The ranks of people above age 65 will swell from 28% of the population in 2000 to 38% in 2010, and then to 50% 
in 2020.  Ibid., and The Economist, 5 July 2003, p. 67. 
17 Robert Aliber, Forward, in Brown, pp. xxviii,xxix,xxxiv; and Brown, pp. 66-7.  Aliber calculates that that the 
expected real rate was only 0.1% in the 1960s, -2.9% in the 1970s, and 0.6% in the 1980s.  Letter to the author, 
January 2002.  
18 While acknowledging that the data are too sparse to admit firm conclusions, Albert Andoh surmises that 
individual investors may actually have lost money on their securities holdings between 1970 and 1985, and again in 
the 1990s. Albert Ando, "On the Japanese Economy and Japanese National Accounts" (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper 8033), December 2000, Appendix Table 2B.  MGI, 2000, Synthesis, p. 2. 
19 In the 1990s households lost some ¥500 trillion, or roughly a year’s GDP, in wealth.  Bergsten et al., p. 67.   
 10
which households subsequently incurred forced them to forswear anything more than a modest, 
gradual decrease in their savings rate through the end of the century. 
 
However rational this frugality was for individual households, the very high private savings rate 
which it entailed was a bane for the nation as a whole.  This was true not only because the surfeit 
funds lowered the cost of capital and facilitated the government’s subsidization of value-
destroying corporations, but also in the more fundamental sense that surplus savings are 
equivalent to inadequate aggregate demand.   It is a basic principle of economics that when too 
many actors postpone spending for too long, corporations cannot sell their output and react by 
shutting down plants and offices, laying off workers, and cutting back on investment in a way 
which perforce causes GDP to shrink.  This recessionary pressure then encourages households 
and companies to reduce their spending still more, which further attenuates aggregate demand.  
To prevent this contractile cycle from causing a recession or depression, it is necessary for some 
sector of the economy to borrow the excess funds and expend them on actual goods and services.  
There are, however, only a few possible destinations for this money:  it might flow abroad to 
finance a trade surplus, be used by the government to support deficit spending, or be wasted by 
companies in the form of unwise capital expenditures.  In the late 1980s and 1990s Japan would 
employ all three of these alternatives, albeit with decidedly mixed results. 
 
 
Part Two: The Bubble and Its Implications 
 
The bubble that inflated in Japanese asset prices in the late 1980s has been described in many 
publications, and a detailed treatment of that misadventure lies beyond the scope of this paper.  
Nevertheless some elements of the subject are crucial to an understanding of Japan's attempts at 
financial and industrial restructuring during the 1990s and so merit brief description here.  Most 
importantly, the bubble encouraged companies to enlarge their investment budgets and this, 
along with a sizeable trade surplus, enabled GDP to keep growing swiftly and the country to 
avoid protracted recession.  Less desirably, the passage of so much credit through an industrial 
system that was already deeply flawed had the collateral effect of aggravating Japan’s structural 
inefficiencies.  This unpleasant fact manifested when the bubble imploded in the early 1990s, 
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initiating an extended slowdown in corporate investment and exposing anew the country’s 
underlying macroeconomic imbalance.   The ultimate import of the bubble, therefore, was to buy 
Japan several years’ prosperity at the price of mortgaging its future. 
 
In the process of maturation, as noted above, a country’s potential growth rate gradually slows as 
it converges with those of the other advanced, industrialized economies.  While researchers 
differ as to when exactly Japan arrived at this watershed, there is fairly unanimous agreement 
that it had done so by the middle 1980s.20  From that point forward its economic performance 
should have been dictated by roughly the same forces as were operating in the United States and 
Germany.  The experience of those countries, in turn, suggests that a mature nation should invest 
some 10-12% of its GDP in private productive capacity each year.  Spending below this rate 
leaves the country with too little plant and equipment and stops it from growing as fast as it 
could whereas spending over it for any significant length of time eventuates in chronic 
oversupply, poor corporate profitability, and recession as firms belatedly decrease the scale of 
their operations to a level commensurate with demand.21  But if private capital expenditures 
stayed in the target range, they usually add enough to the productive stock to enable GDP to 
grow at 2-3% per annum without engendering any major imbalances in the industrial and 
financial systems.  It consequently made perfect sense that Japan's rate of private non-residential 
investment would decline to 13.0% of national output in the first half of the 1980s and that the 
pace of the economy’s expansion would slow to 3.0% per annum.  Such deceleration was just 
what one would have expected from a country at that stage of industrialization.22  Less 
understandable, however, was the fact that in the latter half of the decade Japanese corporations 
dramatically increased their capital expenditures and the rate of GDP growth rose to a yearly 
average of 4.7%.  This sudden acceleration of commercial activity contradicted the empirical 
precedents and raised serious questions about how Japan was allocating its resources.  
 
[Chart 4: The Bubble] 
 
                                                 
20 Porter et al., pp. 16,118.  Mikitani, “The Facts”, pp. 29,31.  Katz, pp. 131-8.  Brown, pp. 64-5. 
21 The United States, for instance, exceeded that level from 1996 through 2000 and subsequently suffered a long 
economic slowdown as corporations reduced their capacity and waited for demand to take up the slack:  hence the 
“jobless recovery” of 2003-2004.  See Chart 4. 
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The solution to this puzzle lies in Japan's capital markets.  In the middle and late 1980s the other 
G7 nations—and particularly the United States—were demanding that Japan stimulate its 
economy so as to suck in more imports and reduce its current account surplus.  Conservative 
officials in the MOF, ever concerned about the government’s finances, argued that this should be 
done not through deficit spending but rather by loosening monetary policy.  So the Bank of 
Japan (BOJ), which was then statutorily subordinate to that ministry, increased the money supply 
somewhat more quickly than its internal rules would normally have permitted.  Abetted by 
careless regulators, the commercial lenders amplified the impact of this change in monetary 
policy by extending new loans to good borrowers and bad ones alike.  Vast growth in liquidity 
ensued, and much of this poured immediately into Japan’s various asset markets.  From March 
1985 to their respective peaks, the price of commercial real estate in Tokyo rose by 155% and 
the value of the Nikkei Average more than doubled.  Such was the genesis of Japan's infamous 
asset bubble. 
  
Besides enriching those who owned corporate equities and property, the sudden growth in the 
money supply also worked a change in firms’ investment decisions.  Since the prices of goods 
and services were relatively stable at the time, the flood of new money caused real interest rates 
to fall.23  This translated into a lower cost of capital, which then motivated companies to amass 
more plant and equipment than they would otherwise have done. The once-celebrated propensity 
of Japanese companies to prioritize the acquisition of market share over short-term profitability 
was thus reinforced, and the pace of capital formation quickened.24   By 1988 the ratio of private 
non-residential investment to GDP had risen to 16.5%, and in 1990 and 1991 it would surpass 
19.0%.  This was almost half again what the country had expended on productive facilities a 
decade earlier, and it greatly exceeded the ratios that obtained contemporaneously in Germany 
and the United States.    
 
[Chart 5: Corporate Investment] 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
22 93SNA, Government Cabinet Office, ESRI. 
23 Olivier Blanchard, "Bubbles, Liquidity Traps, and Monetary Policy" in Mikitani and Posen, pp. 186-7.  
24 Ibid.  Also, Shimizu, p. 60; Katz, pp. 215-6; and Porter et al., pp. 75-7. 
 13
In immediate macroeconomic terms, this was an auspicious turn of events.  If Japan had 
followed the normal trajectory for an industrializing economy, corporate investment would have 
continued to decrease through the late 1980s and there would soon have been insufficient 
demand to exhaust all of the country’s domestic savings.  The textbook solution to this problem 
would have been for the unneeded money to flow abroad so that foreigners could procure more 
of Japan’s output.  Unfortunately, Japan’s trading partners were already complaining 
vociferously that it was exporting too much and hinting at the possibility of countervailing 
protectionism; they would doubtless have reacted harshly if net exports grew much further.25  
There was also some question, as a practical matter, whether the world could have adapted to 
what must, given the size of the Japanese economy, be an immense increase in the global supply 
of funds.  Accommodating such a change would have forced many countries’ current accounts 
into deficit, pushed up their unemployment rates, and in some cases provoked serious domestic 
strife.  So Japan faced a daunting task in the middle 1990s:  assuming that it could not channel 
much more of its savings abroad, it must find a domestic destination for its capital or watch as 
the weakness of aggregate demand pulled the country into a long and possibly deep recession. 
The loose monetary policy and lax banking practices of the bubble period resolved this dilemma 
by stimulating rapid growth in corporate investment, which rose far above the efficient level and 
thereby added considerably to aggregate demand and to GDP.  Thus the same dynamics that 
inflated the asset bubble also produced the economic efflorescence that characterized the years 
after 1985. 
 
Needless to say, few objected to this faster growth.  Corporations benefited from Japan’s new 
vitality insofar as their revenues increased and pressure to restructure abated; banks gained from 
strong loan demand and from appreciation in their stock portfolios; and households prospered 
because employment and wages remained strong even as the returns generated by their stock and 
real estate investments improved.26  Their spirits buoyed by this upturn, the Japanese people 
curtailed their savings somewhat and consumed a bit more of their income, thus further 
augmenting aggregate demand.  The euphoria of the bubble years also redounded to the 
advantage of the Liberal Democratic Party, which took credit for the economy's resilience and 
                                                 
25 Bergsten et al., pp. 34-6,100-3. 
26 Andoh, pp. Appendix Table 2B.  Martin Wolf, in Financial Times, 9 May 2001. 
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managed to stay in power despite a series of corruption scandals which might have proved 
disastrous had they coincided with a deceleration in GDP growth.27  There were occasional signs 
that not all was well; some commentators warned, for instance, that Japan’s reliance on copious 
capital investment was dangerous and that the financial system was foundering.  But these were 
voices in the wilderness.  Almost all of the country’s businessmen, bureaucrats, and political 
leaders were preoccupied with their quotidian responsibilities and saw no need to focus on what 
looked like trivial defects in the industrial and banking sectors. 
 
The passage of time, however, would soon dispel this insouciance.  In 1989 the mandarins in the 
BOJ started hiking interest rates in order to dampen the market’s enthusiasm and stop the 
economy from overheating.  Stock prices accordingly peaked in the summer of that year and then 
started to fall.  By 1993 the Nikkei average had lost 55% of its value and the price of commercial 
property in Tokyo had plummeted 47%.  This decline in asset prices would in fact last through 
the end of the decade, eventually engendering a bout of comparably destructive price deflation.   
 
The significance of these events was not entirely obvious in the early 1990s.  It is always 
difficult to identify a bubble during its inception or indeed for months after it begins to 
collapse—witness Allen Greenspan’s ebullient public comments in October 2000, long after the 
American technology bubble had begun to implode.28  So too, a decade earlier, did Japanese 
executives, regulators, and politicians feel confident that their economy would soon resume its 
erstwhile fast growth.  The mood in Tokyo was still sanguine as late as 1993, when Eisuke 
Sakakibara, the prominent MOF official, published the English version of his triumphal Beyond 
Capitalism, which contended that Japan’s economic system was superior to Western capitalism 
and should be imitated by the rest of the world.29  To such commentators it seemed that the 
necessary adjustment was well underway, for not only had asset prices dropped sharply but 
                                                 
27 The Recruit Scandal occurred in 1989 (Schlesinger, pp. 233-7), and soon thereafter the LDP lost control of the 
House of Councilors ( ibid., p. 248).  The early 1990s brought the Sagawa Kyubin Scandal (ibid., pp. 245-7,251); a 
mass defection from the LDP (ibid., pp. 264-70); and the Liberal Democrats’ 1993 loss of control of the House of 
Representatives, and hence of the government. The LDP returned to power several months later (ibid., pp. 271-7), 
but their sojourn in opposition had persuaded the party’s leaders that their power was tenuous and that controversial 
policies should be eschewed. 
28 Allan Greenspan, “Challenges for Economic Policymakers”, a speech at the 18th Annual Monetary Conference, 
Washington, DC, 19 October 2000. 
29 The Japanese edition is more blatant in this regard, but the sense of superiority is still evident in the English.  
Sakakibara, Beyond Capitalism.  
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corporations were also shrinking their investment budgets and promising to implement ambitious 
cost-cutting schemes.  If one assumed—as these optimists generally did—that Japan’s potential 
growth rate remained as high as those of many developing nations, logic suggested that the 
proposed reforms would soon restore the economy to health. 
  
This optimism, though, failed to account for several facts.  One was the sheer magnitude of the 
Japanese bubble, which dwarfed those experienced by many other countries and would have 
entailed a lengthier period of recuperation even in the absence of other complications.  Another 
was the deep involvement of the commercial and retail banks, for this implicated the 
mechanisms of credit creation and impaired the efficacy of monetary policy, thus intensifying 
Japan’s deflationary tendencies.  Still another was the nexus of interests shared by Japan's older 
and less efficient corporations and banks, the civil service, and the LDP inasmuch as cooperation 
between these groups inhibited institutional change and discouraged the reallocation of human 
and material resources that would have helped produce a lasting recovery.30  But most important 
was the inadequacy of aggregate demand.  What Sakakibara and so many others failed to 
perceive in the early 1990s was that the bubble had concealed a structural surplus of savings and 
that its collapse was both uncovering and exacerbating that vulnerability.  For as households and 
corporations grew poorer, they reacted by curtailing their expenditures and expanding their 
savings; and this caused the gap between aggregate supply and demand to widen.31 As urgently 
as at any time in the past, Japan needed to find an outlet for its surplus capital lest its economy 
stagnate or start to contract. 
 
 
Part Three: Industries beyond Capitalism 
In the early 1990s Japan faced an immense challenge.   Over the longer term the best way to 
lower the savings rate was to restructure the country’s more backward industries so that they 
wasted less of their earnings on useless capital projects and disgorged more wealth to workers 
and individual investors, who could then attain their financial goals while also spending more on 
                                                 
30 Mikitani, “The Facts”, p. 29.  Porter et al., pp. 4-14,75. Sakakibara admits the nexus, if not its disadvantages. 
Sakakibara, Beyond Capitalism, pp. 5,28,45,62-3. 
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goods and services. In the short term, though, such restructuring would bring bankruptcies, 
layoffs, anxiety, a diminution in consumption and investment, and very possibly a recession.  To 
make a reform program work, therefore, the government must loosen fiscal or monetary policy to 
protect households until the restructuring process reached fruition in a higher rate of GDP 
growth. Both of these stimulatory options, however, were foreclosed by political factors.  
Foreign governments, as explained above, objected strenuously to the prospect of aggressive 
monetary easing whereas officials in the powerful MOF adamantly opposed the prospect of big 
budget deficits.  Japan was thus left with no macroeconomic means of facilitating industrial and 
financial reorganization.  Further complicating this predicament was the belief, both at home and 
abroad, that the economy was basically sound and required neither fundamental reconstruction 
nor bold stimulus.  So Tokyo was inclined to temporize, adopting marginal reforms and modestly 
expansionary fiscal policies while eschewing comprehensive change of the sort which might 
have threatened the country’s political and social institutions.  
 
It is easy to demonstrate, on a macroeconomic level, that Japan undertook little restructuring 
during its “lost decade”.  The most conspicuous symptom of its illness during the late 1980s had 
been inordinate spending on plant and equipment, and this profligacy continued throughout the 
following decade. It is true that the ratio of private non-residential investment to GDP fell from 
19.1% in 1991 to only 14.4% in 1994, but this was still well over the rate appropriate to a 
country of Japan’s maturity.  Put simply, many industries were still amassing capacity that they 
could never realistically hope to employ. The situation worsened further in 1995-1997, when a 
series of anomalous events seemed to portend a return to the torrid growth of the bubble period 
and persuaded the corporate sector to increase its capital expenditures to over 16% of GDP in 
1997 and 1998.32   But then, unfortunately, the pace of economic activity decelerated again and 
Japanese and foreign economists realized that much of the new productive capacity was entirely 
superfluous.  As one writer would later quip, corporate investment in these years was "so 
inefficient that it might as well be considered consumption".33  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
31 The year-over year rate of growth in consumption averaged 5.3% in 1990-1992, then slowed to 2.2% in 1993-5 
and to 1.1% in 1997-1999. The propensity to consume declined from 75.3% in 1990, to 72.5% in 1995, and then to 
71.3% in 1998. Tokei Geppo, November 1997, pp. 2,10; and November 2000, pp. 4,14. 
32 On the unsustainability of this apparent recovery, see note 101. 
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[Chart 6: Capacity Utilization]  
 
There are many ways to gauge the effect of this rampant capital spending. For the industrial 
economy as a whole, data compiled by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, 
subsequently METI) reveal that Japan was exceedingly slow in adapting when aggregate demand 
slackened in the early 1990s.34  The ministry’s utilization index shows that, as one would expect, 
the bursting of the bubble depressed consumption and investment and hence lowered the 
operating rate for existing facilities quite sharply.  Manufacturing activity would remain subdued 
for the rest of the decade.  Yet despite this prolonged weakness in demand, corporations kept 
adding to Japan’s stock of plant and equipment, as reflected in MITI’s capacity index, until 
November 1997.  Moreover, the subsequent cuts in investment budgets were so small that the 
total volume of plant and equipment at the end of the decade was exactly the same as it had been 
in late 1992.  On a net basis industrial Japan had managed to achieve no restructuring.35  
 
[Chart 7: Capital Productivity] 
[Chart 8:  Comparative ROEs] 
  
The failure to restrict capacity at a time of flagging demand further vitiated the economy's 
efficiency and profitability. This is apparent in the ratio of GDP to productive capital, which 
measures how much output a country can generate per unit of plant and equipment.  This 
indicator demonstrates that Japan's operational efficiency started to erode in the 1970s, when the 
LDP became more magnanimous in its dealings with powerful vested interests, and that the 
erosion persisted through the end of the century.   The pace of the decline slowed somewhat 
during the bubble years, when pigs could and did fly, but then accelerated again in the early 
1990s.  Studies of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) confirm this general pattern, as do a wide 
variety of anecdotal evidence.36  The same is true of the Return on Equity (ROE) earned by 
                                                                                                                                                             
33 Martin Wolf, Financial Times, 16 February 2000. 
34 The name of this agency was subsequently changed to the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry, or METI.   
35 For an even more pessimistic conclusion, see:  Robert Feldman, "ROA Whodunit:  Every Nook and Cranny", in 
Morgan Stanley, Global Economic Forum, 31 May 2000, pp. 3-6.  
36 Compare: Bart van Ark and Dirk Pilat, "Productivity Levels in Germany, Japan, and the United States:  
Differences and Causes", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:  Microeconomics No. 2 (Washington, DC:  
Brookings Institute, 1993), pp. 56-73; Okubo, Sumiye, Prospects for Growth in Japan in the 21st Century 
(Washington, DC:  Department of Commerce, 1996), p. 36; and OECD, Economic Surveys: Japan, Volume 2002, 
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Japan’s big non-financial firms, which fell from 8.2% in 1988 to an average of 3.1% between 
1992 and 1999.  Estimates by Goldman Sachs suggest that at no point during this period did 
Japanese industry earn enough to cover its cost of capital, which means that the average 
company was actually destroying value.37  The macroeconomic record of the 1990s was thus one 
of chronic overinvestment and overcapacity and consequently of little corporate contribution to 
sustained GDP growth.  
 
[Chart 9:  Automobile Capacity and Output] 
 
Microeconomic analysis of particular industries—automobiles as an example from the world-
class export sector, and retail stores as typical of the backward domestic sector—not only 
vindicates these macroeconomic conclusions but also elucidates their causes.  Some of Japan’s 
finest enterprises, and the object of much international emulation, were its car and truck 
manufacturers.  Productivity among these firms was consistently superior to that of their 
competitors in Germany and the United States.38  By the middle 1980s, however, the industry 
was already showing some signs of overcapacity.  This problem was manageable as long as the 
bubble inflated demand for vehicles at home and a stable yen promoted exports abroad;  auto 
production accordingly peaked at 13,487,000 units in 1990 and slowed only slightly to 
13,245,000 in 1991.  Assuming that this represented the textbook definition of "full 
employment", or 85% of total capacity, then the industry was probably able to produce almost 16 
million cars per annum during this period.  It was therefore inevitable that the manufacturers 
would be badly hurt when the asset deflation of the early 1990s sapped domestic demand, 
causing yearly sales to fall sharply and never again to surpass 10,196,000 units.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Supplement No. 2-January 2003, p. 105. Anecdotally, studies by McKinsey & Company estimated that Japan’s 
capital productivity declined marginally from 63% of the US average in 1990-1993 to 61% in 1999 while its labor 
productivity fell from 83% of the American standard in 1990 to only 69% in 1999.  MGI, Manufacturing 
Productivity (Washington, DC: MGI, 1993), Executive Summary, pp-2, Exhibit S-1; and Conclusion, pp. 1-3.  MGI, 
Capital Productivity (Washington, DC: MGI, 1996), Synthesis, pp. 1-5 and Exhibit 1.  MGI, 2000, Aggregate 
Analysis, p. 7 and Synthesis, pp. 1,30. See also IHT, 11 August 2000.   
37 For the ROE data, see: Goldman Sachs, Japan Strategy Flash, 14 May 2001, p. 3.  On the value destruction, see:  
Goldman Sachs Global Strategy Research, Who Are the True Value Creators?, 13 February 2002, pp. 1-3.  See also, 
Porter, pp. 3,101. 
38 MGI, 1993, “Executive Summary”, Exhibit S-1; MGI, 1996, “Synthesis”, Exhibit 3-1b,3-1c,3-2; and MGI, 2000, 
“Executive Summary”, p. 1.  
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That demand would decrease ought not to have been a surprise.  With very little population 
growth and a comparatively equitable distribution of income and wealth, Japanese households 
already had almost all the cars they wanted; the scope for more domestic sales was quite limited. 
Meanwhile, between 1993 and 1998 the manufacturers had doubled their overseas productive 
capacity from 3 million to 6 million autos per annum because, in the words of one CEO, “we 
[wanted] to build cars in the markets where we sell them".39  This, after all, was the best way to 
avoid the imposition of trade restraints.  But since these new facilities could easily accommodate 
increases in overseas demand, they had the collateral effect of weakening demand for vehicles 
produced by Japan’s domestic factories.   Constrained at home and abroad, the domestic industry 
was laboring under an immense burden of excess plant and equipment. 
 
A simple concern for profitability should have compelled these corporations to close some of 
their Japanese factories and reconcile themselves to a permanently lower level of output.  But 
rather than consolidating their facilities in this way, the companies maintained their domestic 
production capacity at roughly its 1992 level throughout the decade, leaving over a third of their 
plant idle for a very long time.40  
 
Some insight into this paradoxical conduct may be gleaned from the history of Nissan Motor, a 
company that in the 2000s would come to symbolize the feasibility and promise of enterprise 
reform.  Nissan's first essay in restructuring came in 1993.  By this time the company had seen 
its rate of capacity utilization decline to 60% and was steadily losing money.41  In response to 
this adverse development management decided to close a plant in Zama City, on the outskirts of 
Tokyo, and to redeploy its personnel from that site to other factories around Japan.  This was a 
rather timid proposal:  even Nissan's labor union endorsed it as the best way to ensure the 
survival of the company and at least some of its employees’ jobs.  The plan suffered a setback, 
however, when Fuji Bank and Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ), Nissan's two largest creditors as 
well as major shareholders, concluded that the closure might offend the Tokyo city government 
and the big political parties and hence did not fully commit themselves to it.  Much of the public 
                                                 
39 Honda Motor's president, Hiroyuki Yoshino, is quoted in: Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 7 February 2002. 
40 Compare the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association data (JAMA) with Nikkei Business, 9 March 1999. 
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did in fact disapprove, for Nissan was patently violating Japanese commercial norms by 
inconveniencing its employees and interrupting business relationships with suppliers and 
distributors.  This widespread chagrin galvanized the Liberal Democratic Minister of Labor, 
Masakuni Murakami, who visited the Zama facility and publicly condemned the restructuring 
scheme.  Not to be outdone by this populist appeal, the Socialist Party, which was on the verge 
of gaining control of the government, launched a full parliamentary investigation in which it 
openly excoriated the company and its managers. Then, after the factory was shut down, Zama 
City refused to permit the sale of the property on which it sat, effectively forcing Nissan to keep 
the useless asset on its books indefinitely.42  The company and its individual executives thus paid 
a high price for their rather modest cost-cutting effort. 
 
Nissan's later and more successful attempt at corporate reorganization took place in a very 
different political climate.  Much of corporate Japan was shocked in the autumn of 1997, when 
Tokyo allowed Yamaichi Securities, Sanyo Securities, and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank—all 
prominent financial institutions—to fail.  The reaction was most extreme at the troubled Fuji and 
Daiichi Kangyo Banks, which feared that the authorities might likewise allow them to succumb 
to bankruptcy.  Since they had lent large sums to Nissan, these creditors demanded that the 
manufacturer do whatever was necessary to restore itself to profitability, a goal it had attained in 
only one year since the closure of the Zama plant in 1993. Nissan could not reinvigorate itself 
without outside capital, though, so the two banks enlisted the government’s help in searching for 
a merger partner that might be willing to play the white knight.  Everyone would have preferred 
that this be a domestic investor, but as the months passed it became clear that no Japanese 
company was prepared to rescue the embattled auto company.  This forced the government to 
look farther afield.  Germany's Daimler was intrigued enough to make some initial inquiries but 
dropped out of the negotiations after a few months.  The balance of opinion in Tokyo then 
shifted in favor of France's Renault; and in early 1999 Prime Minister Obuchi, MITI, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and several other official agencies publicly stated that they approved 
                                                                                                                                                             
41 The following discussion relies heavily on Chapter Nine of Tiberghien, Yves, Political Mediation of Global 
Economic Forces:  The Politics of Corporate Restructuring in Japan, France, and South Korea, Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Stanford University, 2002. 
42 Interviews with a confidential source who was a ranking government official during the 1993-4 period and 
subsequently became a member of Nissan’s board of directors.  January and March 2002.  
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of that company's bid for a controlling stake in Nissan.43  This, they all realized, was the only 
way to prevent the corporation from collapsing in a manner which would not only cost its 
employees their jobs but also do grave damage the financial system. 
 
The almost universal agreement that foreign ownership and reform were the only way to save 
Nissan was crucial to that company’s transformation. In October 1999 the new Chief Executive 
Officer, Carlos Ghosn, announced a bold "revival plan" that included discharging 21,000 
workers over three years, closing five out of eleven domestic factories, the liquidation of equity 
stakes in over 1,000 affiliated corporations, and the severance of commercial relations with the 
vast majority of Nissan's subcontractors.44  Although ostensibly revolutionary, these specific 
initiatives had all been formulated by mid-level managers in the years after 1993 and were 
widely recognized as essential to the company's future viability. The reason they had not been 
implemented previously was because Nissan's executives feared another political backlash. 
Ghosn, however, had more freedom.  As a foreigner with firm support from the Japanese 
government he could safely assail the lifetime employment system, the customary relationships 
between corporations and local communities, and the manufacturer’s financial connections to 
other companies.  The revival plan was still criticized—in a famous article Toyota’s chairman, 
Hiroshi Okuda, intimated that Nissan's executives should consider committing suicide—but 
these conservatives now wielded much less influence than they had during the Zama episode.  
 
When Nissan returned to profitability in fiscal 2000, most commentators agreed that the firm had 
been correct in undertaking its reforms.45  But Nissan was an anomalous case; for the other auto 
companies the political and social barriers to restructuring were as formidable as ever.   In fact, 
as late as the summer of 2001 the strident Mr. Okuda could still be heard asserting that profit 
maximization was not a proper goal for a Japanese corporation to pursue.46  Such stubbornness 
was quite common in the automobile sector, and there was no countervailing sense of crisis such 
that the other producers might follow Nissan's lead.  The vehicle manufacturers consequently 
assumed a cautious stance, announcing some relatively minor changes but retaining most of their 
                                                 
43 Asahi Shimbun, 14 March 1999; and Kyodo News, 19 October 1999.  Financial Times, 13 July 1999.  
44 Chigusa, pp. 130-1. Confidential Nissan source, March 2002. 
45 NikkeiNet, 27 November 2000. 
46 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Japan Country Report, June 2000, p. 30. 
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existing capacity into the early 2000s.47  Some executives still hoped that the ever elusive return 
of strong GDP growth would enable them to put their excess plant to use, but most had come to 
view overcapacity as a permanent feature of their industry. Nissan was thus the exception 
proving the rule that in the Japanese context restructuring was still exceedingly difficult. 
 
If the automobile industry was one of Japan’s most competitive, the retail sector was one of its 
least.  Productivity in this part of the economy was in the 1990s less than half that of its 
counterpart in the United States, so the case for reform was compelling.48  Yet as was true of the 
vehicle manufacturers, retailers confronted barriers to change which virtually guaranteed that 
their financial performance would steadily deteriorate.  Prominent among these obstacles were 
the predominance of inefficiently small companies, a lack of competition between large 
corporations, and an insistence in some segments of the industry on increasing capacity almost 
regardless of the level of consumer demand.  Again like the auto companies, much of this 
intransigence should be ascribed to political and social values that informed not just the retail 
market but the entire economy. 
 
[Chart 10:  Retail Industry Structure]  
 
During the last few decades the nature of the retailing business in many industrialized countries 
has evolved dramatically, with discount outlets, specialty stores, and supermarkets displacing 
inefficient "mom-and-pop" operations. In Japan, however, such evolution was impeded by an 
array of cultural and legal institutions which protected feckless little enterprises.  A combination 
of low property duties and high taxes on capital gains, for instance, penalized those owners who 
closed their shops and sold off the underlying real estate.  Obviously, this discouraged industry 
consolidation.  So too did the Large Scale Retail Law, which until its revision in April 1999 gave 
local communities and shopkeepers the right to block the entry of big stores into their 
neighborhoods.49  In addition, beginning in 1998 the government provided small firms with some 
                                                 
47 For Toyota’s timid restructuring scheme, see: Nikkei Net, 21 December 2000.  On the industry’s overcapacity, 
see: Nikkei Business, 9 March 1999; and Asian Wall Street Journal, 7 November 2001. 
48 MGI, 2000, “Synthesis”, p. 32.  Also, James Kondo, William W. Lewis, Vincent Palmade, and Yoshinori 
Yokoyama, “Reviving Japan’s Economy”, McKinsey Quarterly, 2000, No. 4, p.22. 
49 MGI, 2000, “Synthesis”, pp. 11,16-9.  OECD, Economic Surveys:  Japan, Volume 2001-December 2001, pp. 121-
2. Bergsten et al., p. 137. 
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¥4 trillion in loan guarantees and sizeable sums in rent assistance, grants for new investment, and 
other subsidies.50  The motive for this largesse was blatantly political—tiny retailers were among 
the more stalwart allies of the LDP and its coalition partner, New Komeito—and its effect was to 
relieve the pressures on poorly performing enterprises to exit the market.  In the late 1990s, 
therefore, “mom-and-pop” stores still accounted for over half of all retail employment despite the 
fact that they were the least competitive companies in a very unproductive industry.51   
 
A separate dynamic eviscerated market forces at the upper end of the market.  The degree of 
continuity here is evident if one compares a list of Japan's ten largest retailers in 1983 with the 
corresponding list for 1998, for over the intervening fifteen years only one corporation had 
dropped from that august rank.52  Among the reasons for this remarkable stasis was the fact that 
the government and the banks deemed some of the retailers "too big to fail".  In the 1970s and 
1980s many department stores, supermarket chains, and other corporations had borrowed against 
their real estate holdings and branched out into such unrelated fields as hospitality, 
transportation, tourism, and real estate.53  By the 1990s a number of these conglomerates had 
become so massive that their failure would do real harm to other companies, banks, bondholders, 
and shareholders. Rather than let this happen, Japanese financial institutions persisted in 
extending credit to all of the retail giants irrespective of their operational health.  Timorous 
regulators, meanwhile, feared the impact that big bankruptcies might have on the labor market 
and accordingly refrained from demanding that the banks desist from this self-destructive 
behavior.   So more funds flowed into marginal and insolvent companies, innovation was 
discouraged, and this part of the market underwent very little structural change. 
 
[Chart 11: Retail Capacity] 
  
                                                 
50 MGI, 2000, “Executive Summary”, pp. 3,9; and “Synthesis”, p. 19. 
51 Kondo et al., p. 24. 
52 By contrast, only five US retailers managed to stay in the top 10 over this period.  MGI, 2000, “Synthesis”, p. 39. 
The degree of concentration in the Japanese industry was also unusually low:  in 1998 large outlets there still 
accounted for only 20% of total sales as opposed to 39% in the United States. Furthermore, only one foreign 
company—Toys ‘R’ Us—had achieved a 1% market share. Ibid., pp. 8,10,41.  
53 Mycal was typical in this regard.  Nikkei Net, 17 September 2001.  For another example, see:  Thomas R. H. 
Havens, Architects of Influence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 203-4. 
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The third peculiarity in the retail sector was a determination among many managers to increase 
the size of their businesses more aggressively than commercial conditions warranted.  The 1990s 
were not good years for Japan’s most prominent supermarket and department store operators; 
total revenues for these “large-scale retailers” rose by only 10.5% between 1990 and 1999, from 
¥20.9 trillion to ¥23.1 trillion.  Given that the industry was already overcapitalized, it could 
probably have accommodated this modest growth in demand without having to increase its rate 
of investment very much.  Some shops should surely have been relocated to better sites and their 
design and management improved, but there was little need for more overall capacity.  
Nevertheless the retailers spent huge sums over the decade, expanding their total floor space 
from 17.3 million square feet at the end of 1990 to 27.2 million square feet at the close of 1999.54   
The number of people working in the industry likewise rose significantly. Thus the big retailers 
acted in a fashion precisely the opposite of what economic theory would have dictated.   
 
To understand this insistence on obtaining ever greater scale, one need only note the barriers to 
exit that confronted inefficient enterprises and the indulgent attitude evinced by their creditors.  
It was in fact very expensive to shut down large stores.  One estimate put the cost of closing a 
single such outlet—including penalties for the premature cancellation of leases, generous 
severance packages for workers, and negotiations with community leaders—at approximately 
¥500 million in the late 1990s.55  Instead of incurring these losses, which they deemed 
prohibitive, many retailers chose to leave their older, loss-producing facilities open even as they 
availed themselves of falling land prices to establish new shops in prime urban districts 
throughout the country.  By the end of the decade, therefore, several conglomerates were 
managing numerous modern boutiques in addition to their older networks of often deserted big 
stores.56  The banks acquiesced in the new investment because they had already lent too much 
money to the major retailers and could not afford to bear the losses that would ensue if any of 
them declared bankruptcy.  The upshot was a bizarre situation in which creditors offered more 
and more money, on progressively better terms, to companies that were marching implacably 
towards insolvency.  Daiei and Sogo corporations exemplified this problem:  their respective 
                                                 
54 NikkeiNet, 27 June 2002. 
55 This was roughly $3.8 million at the current exchange rate.  Nakamae International Economic Research, Quarterly 
Report, June 2000, pp. 10-11.  Goldman Sachs's retail specialist, Yukihiro Moroe, believes this estimate is too low.  
Interview, March 2002. 
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debts rose by 62% and 204% between 1992 and 1999, and yet the interest rates they paid on their 
obligations eventually fell well below those charged to Japan’s best retailers.57  Sustained by 
these funds Sogo was able to survive until the controversial Shinsei Bank withdrew its loans in 
2000, and Daiei staggered on even longer.58  Along with the prevalence of inefficient small 
companies and the lack of competition between big enterprises, this tendency to overinvest 
ensured that the retail industry remained overcapitalized, generated a constant stream of non-
performing loans (NPLs) for the financial system to absorb, and provided very little impetus 
towards stronger GDP growth. 
 
[Chart 12:  Cross-shareholdings] 
 
As illustrated by these specific cases, Japanese firms in a wide range of industries had an 
incentive to invest ambitiously even in adverse economic circumstances.  Of course, 
countervailing influences were also important from time to time.  In 1996 and 1997 Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto oversaw the deregulation of the airline industry, partially liberalized 
the telecommunications sector, and initiated a "Big Bang” program of reforms that was intended 
to bring Japan's financial and accounting practices up to global standards by the year 2000.59  
Another sign of progress was the unraveling of the web of equity stakes that tied companies and 
banks together and enabled them to influence each other’s business decisions.  One measure of 
these “cross-shareholdings” shows them decreasing from 52% of the stockmarket’s total value in 
1988 to 49% thereof in 1995 and then, somewhat more quickly, to 39% in 1999.  Since these 
financial relationships sheltered firms from the rigors of the market, their attenuation both 
reflected and intensified the process of restructuring.  The same was true of corporate 
bankruptcies, which proliferated in the latter half of the decade both numerically and in terms of 
the failing enterprises’ net liabilities.60  Yet as signified by MITI’s index of overall industrial 
                                                                                                                                                             
56 For example, The Oriental Economist, October 2001, p. 10. 
57 MGI, Synthesis, pp. 19,49. Mikuni & Company, “Can Japanese Economic Policy Escape the Bond Market’s 
Discipline?”, (unpublished) 23 September 2002. 
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capacity and by the falling ratio of GDP to the nation’s productive stock, these changes were 
marginal—certainly insufficient to produce a quantifiably better macroeconomic performance. 
 
In summary, then, Japanese industry never really adjusted to the implosion of the bubble in 
1989-1991 or to the resulting diminution in aggregate demand.  Corporations decreased their 
investment budgets somewhat; but the volume of such spending was still too high relative to 
household consumption and net exports, so large swathes of plant lay idle throughout the decade.  
Many factors informed this recalcitrance, including cultural norms, laws, and the preferences of 
employees and local and national politicians.  Also essential was the absence of a sense of crisis 
which might have inspired the Japanese people and their leaders to overcome their conservative 
proclivities and enact the reforms necessary to render the industrial economy more profitable, 
enrich households, and bring down the national savings rate.  But no crisis befell the country 
until the bank failures of 1997-1998, and that challenge was quickly surmounted through 
government bailouts and a burst of fiscal spending.  The process of restructuring accordingly 
made little headway, aggregate demand continued weak, and the economy remained susceptible 
to recessionary pressures. 
  
 
Part Four: The Complicity of Financiers 
The financial system both facilitated the corporate sector’s reckless investment and was harmed 
by it.  Economic deceleration of the magnitude that occurred in Japan between the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s would have harmed any country’s banks inasmuch as it both impaired the quality 
of existing assets and eviscerated demand for new loans.  But in the Japanese instance these 
more general difficulties were aggravated by several unique traits, including an unusually heavy 
reliance by industrial firms on bank intermediation, an ill-conceived program of deregulation 
which left overcapitalized lenders chasing ever worse customers, and the aforementioned 
inclination of elected leaders and civil service to use the banks as a tool for the achievement of 
social and political goals as well as to pursue strictly economic desiderata.  Never did the balance 
of political interests favor the deconstruction of this system.  There were occasional forays into 
reformist territory—witness, again, the elements of the Big Bang program that were actually 
adopted—but for the most part the banks’ lending practices did not change during the period in 
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question.  As before, those institutions insisted on supplying funds to both creditworthy and 
uncreditworthy borrowers, and many of the latter invested unwisely and hence were later unable 
to repay their debts.  To this extent the costs of sustaining aggregate demand through inefficient 
capital expenditures were borne by Japan’s financial system. 
 
[Chart 13: Household Assets]  
[Chart 14: Corporate Finance] 
 
Banks have long played a central role in the Japanese economy. As late as 1999 more than half 
of Japan's household savings were deposited in such institutions, or in the postal savings system, 
whereas the comparable figure for the United States was just 10.7%.  These intermediaries, in 
turn, channeled a large proportion of the funds they raised into industrial enterprises:  at the end 
of the decade the average non-financial enterprise still raised 41% of its funds from bank loans as 
opposed to 13% for US companies.  Bolstering these lending relationships were strong 
ownership ties because, as stated above, banks and their clients often owned much of each 
other’s equity.61  These cross-shareholdings were the cement that bound the "main bank" groups 
together, with several affiliated companies clustering around a single lender to constitute an 
informal association that often influenced its members’ investment, operational and marketing 
decisions. By the middle 1990s this system had begun to break down, but financiers and 
borrowers still routinely interfered in one another’s internal affairs.
 
The prominence of banks in the Japanese economy was partly an historical phenomenon, as is 
the case in some European countries, but it additionally reflected the preference of bureaucrats 
and corporate executives to work through institutions that were more susceptible to political 
suasion than, say, anonymous stock and bond markets.62  The tractability of the banking 
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system—or, more accurately, the political sensitivity of its managers—was useful in many ways.  
Most immediately, it enabled the government to contain financial shocks.  When an individual 
lender encountered serious trouble the regulators would cajole healthier firms into refinancing it 
or, perhaps, merging with it.  During the era of this "convoy system", which lasted from the 
middle 1950s to the middle 1990s, these centrally organized rescue campaigns worked so well 
that no big bank ever collapsed.  But the utility of biddable financial intermediaries was not 
limited to addressing financial crises:  it was also conducive to the resolution of problems in the 
industrial sector.  In the event of a recession or market downturn, regulators and corporate 
leaders could enlist the banks’ help in organizing cartels, mergers, and other mechanisms for 
managing excess capacity and preventing inconveniently big bankruptcies.  Such negotiations 
were the first resort when Nissan neared insolvency in 1999; it was only when that company's 
main banks demurred and no other domestic firms could be pressed into a salvage operation that 
the government finally endorsed Renault’s bid for control.  Public spectacles of this sort, though, 
seldom took place.  The ability of the regulators to deflect minatory economic forces before they 
triggered such disruptions was in fact one of the defining elements of Japanese dirigisme. 
  
Another salient attribute of Japan's banking industry was the changing composition of its 
clientele.  As financial deregulation proceeded in the late 1970s and 1980s, Japan's best 
manufacturers and exporters reduced their dependence on bank loans and went instead to capital 
markets to raise most of their funds.  By the end of the century this rather small category of 
enterprises would be financing itself much like the best Western corporations.63  Unfortunately 
for Japan, these internationally competitive borrowers turned away from the banking system just 
as it was undergoing tremendous growth.  When interest rates were deregulated in 1985 they 
started to rise, enticing households to put much more of their money into savings and demand 
deposits.  The banks’ total liabilities consequently doubled, rising from ¥237 trillion in January 
1985 to ¥495 trillion in December 1990.  Such prodigious expansion put the financial institutions 
in a precarious situation.  They needed to increase their lending markedly but could only do so 
by lowering their standards and providing credit to a weaker and less profitable clientele—
property developers, for example, and small and medium-sized enterprises, individuals, overseas 
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corporations, and the services industry.64  The only big customers that stayed loyal to the banks 
during this transitional period were those which were too fragile to appeal to Japan’s relatively 
discriminating debt and equity investors:  those, in other words, which had no other choice. 
 
As the quality of their loan portfolios deteriorated, the banks sought to hedge their exposure to 
dubious companies by relying more heavily on real estate and corporate securities as collateral.  
Such liens had historically been very important in Japan.  In the most sophisticated Western 
economies, banks base their lending decisions on the capacity of borrowers to earn enough 
money to repay the interest and principal of their debts. Collateral is frequently evaluated in 
individual decisions, but the foremost concern is whether a firm can consistently fulfill its 
contractual obligations.  In Japan and other Asian countries, by contrast, banks often ignore a 
potential borrower's earning power and focus instead on the value of its tangible assets. This 
worked well as long as property prices were flat or rising, as was the case in Japan from the early 
1950s through the late 1980s, because the value of the underlying real estate was never in 
jeopardy.  It therefore seemed natural to those bankers who were, during the bubble period, 
extending loans to so many marginal enterprises to rely more heavily on collateralization.  While 
the ratio of property-backed loans to all secured loans remained fairly constant through these 
years, the amount of money lent against such collateral rose from some 70% of its market value 
to, in many instances, well over 100%.65  Where real estate was unavailable, furthermore, the 
banks assumed liens on equity- and bond-holdings to secure lines of credit to new clients.  But 
their speculation did not end there.  Eager to participate in the stockmarket’s apparently endless 
appreciation, the lenders also purchased a great deal of corporate paper for their own accounts.66  
In this way Japan’s major financial institutions placed multiple bets on the proposition that asset 
prices could move in but one direction.  
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 [Chart 15:  Deposits and Lending] 
 
Because of this reckless gamble, the market crash that began in 1989 did far more damage to the 
financial system than would otherwise have been the case. According to the government's 
statistics, which would time and again prove too optimistic, the volume of NPLs in the banking 
industry increased from a negligible percentage of its total assets at the beginning of the decade 
to 6% thereof in 1997.67  This was a prodigious sum, representing over 4% of annual GDP.  
Households recognized early that the banks were compromised and responded by entrusting less 
of their money to them.  After growing very swiftly in the late 1980s, deposits at such 
institutions shrank from ¥495 trillion at the end of 1990 to ¥445 trillion in January 1994 even as 
the assets in the postal savings system, which enjoyed a government guarantee and hence was 
perceived as a safer alternative, ballooned from ¥134 trillion to ¥182 trillion.  As their capital 
bases contracted the banks should logically have begun to reduce their outstanding loans or, at 
the very least, have refrained from extending new ones.  They did not, however, do this.  To the 
contrary, the banks expanded their outstanding loans and discounts from ¥443 trillion at the end 
of 1990 to over ¥480 trillion in late 1995 and early 1996.  Even more strikingly, they supplied 
more capital to the real estate industry, which had been devastated by falling property values and 
plainly deserved no additional credit.68  It was as if the commercial lenders had not noticed that 
the bubble had burst. 
 
[Chart 16:  Postal Savings System] 
 
The explanation for this curious behavior, once again, is that none of the major economic actors 
had an incentive to admit that the financial system was malfunctioning or to implement the 
reforms that would have repaired it.  Most obviously, the lenders did not want to write off their 
bad loans because doing so would be embarrassing and, if the process depleted too much reserve 
capital, perhaps fatal.69  Underscoring this reluctance to foreclose on insolvent borrowers were 
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the government's explicit and implicit guarantee of deposits and the low interest rates that 
obtained throughout the 1990s, for these minimized the cost of holding questionable assets on 
one's books.  In effect, the monetary authorities had given the banks an inexpensive "call option" 
on any improvement in their customers' businesses, for if an eventual economic recovery 
revitalized the delinquent borrowers their debts might become collectable or even profitable.  It 
was to preserve the value of this option that financial institutions, especially those banks that had 
already incurred substantial damage, kept rolling over loans to some of their worst borrowers, 
including real estate and construction companies and such embattled retailers as Sogo, Mycal, 
and Daiei.70  Large parts of corporate Japan, in the meantime, were also reluctant to espouse a 
program of thorough financial restructuring.  On the one hand the managers of unprofitable 
companies realized that they would be among the first victims of a contraction in credit whereas, 
on the other, senior executives at many stronger enterprises worried about the fate of their 
suppliers, distributors, and affiliated companies.  To such businessmen it seemed better to let 
sleeping dogs lie. 
 
The civil service, too, was inclined to dither.  In the early 1990s such leaders as Kiichi 
Miyazawa, who would serve as both finance minister and prime minister, occasionally bruited 
the notion that the banks were undercapitalized and needed an injection of public money, but the 
bureaucratic and popular response to these statements was uniformly negative.71   Voters had in 
fact long resented the financiers’ cozy relations with big business, the regulators, and the ruling 
party, and had lately come to feel that collusion between these groups was to blame for the asset 
bubble and its painful aftermath.  There was, in short, virtually no political support for the use of 
state funds to bail out the big lenders. The dangers of challenging this sentiment became evident 
in 1995, when the Ministry of Finance (MOF) admitted that the Jusen mortgage companies were 
overwhelmed by NPLs, could not recover on their own, and must be dissolved.72  The ministry 
initially tried to spread the costs of these closures among the Jusen's owners, but some of the 
creditor banks refused to participate in a traditional "convoy" exercise and the powerful 
agricultural cooperatives enlisted the aid of their allies in the LDP to circumvent the requirement 
that they pay their full share.  This forced the government to absorb ¥685 billion in losses. 
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Popular fury over this subsidy tarnished the MOF’s prestige and contributed to the Diet's 
decision in 1997 to scrutinize that ministry’s internal operations, deprive it of control over the 
Bank of Japan, and entrust the supervision of the commercial banks to a newly formed Financial 
Supervisory Agency (FSA).73  Thus chastened, the bureaucrats stuck their heads back in the 
sand, issuing frequent assurances that the financial system was secure and hoping that the voters’ 
hostility would soon dissipate.   
 
[Chart 17:  Distribution of NPLs] 
 
Japan’s political leadership—meaning effectively the LDP, which controlled the government for 
almost all of the 1990s—shared the widespread predisposition to procrastinate.  Lacking its own 
expertise in financial matters, the party depended on the inadequate information emanating from 
the MOF and consequently could not easily formulate appropriate remedial policies.74  But the 
Liberal Democrats may have failed to act even if they fully comprehended the fragility of the big 
financial institutions for the simple reason that most of the NPLs were concentrated in the real 
estate, construction, retail and wholesale, and services industries from which they and their 
coalition partners derived critical campaign donations and logistical assistance. Fear of the 
electorate reinforced this reticence, for the LDP had not escaped the Jusen imbroglio entirely 
unscathed and therefore did not want to brave the public’s wrath by using government money to 
help another category of unpopular financiers.  Thus the balance of interests between banks, 
businesses, bureaucrats, and parliamentarians favored a policy of inaction, letting more capital 
flow to debtors in the hope that they might be resuscitated by an eventual resurgence of GDP 
growth.  
 
This conservative consensus foundered in November 1997, when Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, 
Yamaichi Securities, and Sanyo Securities failed.  These bankruptcies engendered real anxiety 
among the citizenry and in financial and political circles, where calls for reform grew more 
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vociferous. The opposition Democratic Party capitalized on the mood of discontent by proposing 
the establishment of a new regulatory scheme that would stiffen disclosure standards, mandate 
higher reserve ratios against bad loans, create a Financial Reconstruction Commission to process 
NPLs, and allow the government to nationalize insolvent banks.75  At first the LDP objected to 
this proposal, but a setback in the Diet election of July 1998 promptly persuaded it to reverse 
course.  In October the government duly agreed to enact the controversial legislation, set aside 
¥60 trillion for possible use in strengthening the banking system, and pledged to install reformist 
officials in the relevant regulatory agencies.  Over the next two years much changed.  Long-
Term Credit Bank (LTCB) and Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) were nationalized, and fourteen other 
City Banks (large commercial lenders) promised to restructure themselves in exchange for ¥7.5 
trillion in state loans.  It was also during this period that most of the big lenders declared their 
intentions to merge into four main groups—Sumitomo Mitsui, Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi, 
Mizuho, and United Financial of Japan—and to write down a much larger proportion of their 
non-performing assets.76  Even the smaller regional banks and credit cooperatives now felt the 
need to consider consolidation.   
  
Yet these changes were more cosmetic than substantive.  Though beyond the temporal scope of 
this paper, LTCB’s post-nationalization experience sheds light on the political topography in 
which the reform process played out.  In particular, the story demonstrates how equivocal a role 
the Financial Supervisory Agency—now renamed the Financial Services Agency (FSA)—played 
in the enforcement of Japan's new laws and regulations.  The drama began in March 2000, when 
a consortium of Western investors purchased the defunct LTCB from the government and 
changed its name to Shinsei, or "Rebirth".  As part of the purchase agreement Shinsei received 
an injection of cash and the right to sell loans from the original portfolio back to the government 
if they lost more than 20% of their face value within a contractually stipulated period of time.77  
The new company conversely made several pledges, including an agreement to supply a certain 
volume of credit to the small and medium-sized enterprises that were so important to the LDP.  
On the basis of this agreement Shinsei became the first City Bank to fall into foreign hands, 
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providing what many observers reckoned was the strongest indication to date that Tokyo had 
become serious about financial reconstruction. 
 
Soon, though, relations between the FSA and Shinsei soured.  It was to be expected that the two 
parties would bicker over whether various assets met the conditions necessary to be "put" back to 
the government, but other conflicts were more disturbing.  One such dispute concerned the 
bank’s NPLs.  In preparing its accounting statements for fiscal 2000 Shinsei informed the 
regulators that it intended to classify 19.6% of its portfolio as non-performing.78  The FSA 
objected to this proposal because it knew that all the City Banks held similar portfolios, and if 
Shinsei pronounced such a high proportion of its assets to be risky the market would expect the 
rest of the major lenders to do the same.  Those banks would then face a real dilemma.  If they 
followed Shinsei’s precedent they would reveal themselves to be insufficiently capitalized, but if 
they refused to do so they would cast doubt on the veracity of their accounting statements and on 
the competence of the regulatory authorities. To forestall such discomfiture, the big banks and 
senior regulators reportedly urged Shinsei to lower its NPL estimate towards the industry norm 
of about 7%.  Shinsei, however, would not budge.  Rather than conform to what it saw as the 
industry’s obfuscatory norms, it went ahead and declared that a fifth of its loans were partially or 
fully impaired.79   
 
A related quarrel arose when Shinsei decided that some of its largest customers were in default 
and accordingly decided to call in its loans to them.80  This confronted the other City Banks, 
several of which had lent sizeable sums to the same corporations, with another awkward choice.  
They could either withdraw their funds from the weak firms, booking huge losses in the process, 
or purchase Shinsei's positions at full face value in an attempt to maintain the fiction that the 
borrowers were still solvent.  The effect of this latter approach, of course, would be to transfer 
bad assets from Shinsei to the other lenders, essentially transforming them into repositories for 
the industry’s NPLs.  Unwilling to accept either of these fates, the City Banks and the FSA 
privately requested that Shinsei refrain from foreclosing on those large enterprises whose 
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bankruptcy would harm the broader financial system.  Shinsei acceded to these pleas in some 
instances; but in others the renegade bank went its own way and thereby precipitated some 
spectacular corporate failures, including that of Sogo Department Stores.  In the process, 
needless to say, Shinsei’s managers infuriated executives at the other City Banks as well as 
numerous conservative officials and parliamentarians. 
   
It was a third dispute, though, that brought the feud between Shinsei and the FSA to national 
attention.  At the end of fiscal 2001 the regulators found that the bank was not allocating enough 
money to small and medium-sized corporations and demanded that it do more to honor its 
contractual commitments.  Shinsei acknowledged its obligation in this regard, but contended that 
the class of borrowers did not deserve more credit and that the government should not force it to 
make uncollectible loans.81  The FSA replied by issuing a "business improvement order" which 
ironically demanded that the bank achieve its lending targets irrespective of the cost of doing so, 
and by quietly pressing Shinsei’s Japanese employees to break ranks with their Western 
colleagues and support the government’s position.  In the most egregious of the FSA’s 
communications, a senior official went so far as to instruct the bank to lend more money to four 
specific   companies that happened to enjoy close ties to the LDP.  Shinsei thought this an 
unwarranted intrusion into its operational decisions and counterattacked by briefing the media on 
the FSA's tactics—even letting reporters read some of the agency’s confidential memoranda.82  
The ensuing articles provoked an uproar.  Seizing upon them, the opposition parties convened 
hearings in the Diet and pointedly questioned the new Koizumi cabinet and the relevant FSA 
personnel about their oversight of the financial sector.  This brought Shinsei a short respite, 
during which the government concentrated on fending off parliamentary criticism, but the bank’s 
relations with the bureaucracy remained tense for years thereafter. 
   
The proposition for which the Shinsei interlude stands is that the reforms of the late 1990s 
neither fundamentally altered the way in which the big banks did business nor severed the 
sometimes improper ties between them and the civil service. The lenders had enlarged their 
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capacity enormously during the bubble period, and there was subsequently very little 
consolidation; in Anil Kashyap’s sardonic words, "the major Japanese banks were 
simultaneously among the largest banks in the world, and the least profitable".83  The Obuchi 
reforms of 1998-1999 brought a much needed recapitalization of these institutions, but the 
promise of cost reductions, better management, and greater profitability went largely 
unfulfilled.84  Indeed, once the immediate crisis had passed the FSA’s lack of enthusiasm for 
corporate restructuring manifested anew.  Instead of forcing the City Banks to foreclose on 
insolvent enterprises and write off the concomitant NPLs, that agency encouraged the lenders to 
forgive delinquent obligations and to extend still more credit to vulnerable borrowers.85  To 
facilitate this, the regulators tacitly permitted the banks to miscategorize their outstanding loans.  
Most of Sogo's and Mycal's debts, for instance, were classified as either fully performing or as 
"requiring monitoring", rather than as risky or uncollectible, until after those corporations filed 
for bankruptcy protection.86  Clearly the lenders and the regulators were determined to conceal 
the truth as long as they possibly could.  The LDP acquiesced in this deception partly because it 
did not comprehend the depth of the rot in the financial system but also in deference to its 
corporate allies, many of which would have been hurt by the imposition of tougher credit 
standards.  
 
[Chart 18:  Bank Profitability] 
 
Hence the erosion of the lenders’ balance sheets that had begun in the late 1980s persisted 
through the end of the century.  The return on assets (ROA) earned by Japan’s commercial banks 
on their core operations, including losses on the disposal of NPLs, was negative every year from 
1993 onwards.  These enterprises could, and did, garner some additional funds by selling the 
stocks and bonds that they had acquired before the inflation of the bubble and realizing the 
associated capital gains.  But this became more difficult as the stockmarket relentlessly declined 
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through the 1990s, and by the year 2000 the banks’ equity portfolios had virtually no unrealized 
gains left to exploit.87  With scant operating income and no more securities profits to reap, the 
lenders were increasingly forced to run down their reserves in order to dispose of bad assets.  Yet 
since they were still supplying funds to insolvent borrowers, their non-performing loans 
continued inevitably to mount.  Even the disingenuous accounts published by the FSA registered 
this fact:  they showed that the volume of NPLs at the City Banks increased every year from 
1998 through the end of the decade and into the early 2000s.  Conditions were direr still, of 
course, if one accepted the relatively credible estimates emanating from private-sector analysts, 
who estimated that the total of such dubious assets at the turn of the century was somewhere 
between ¥100 and ¥150 trillion.88  By this point it seemed that the industry, and especially the 
some of the more troubled regional banks, might eventually need another infusion of public 
capital if they were ever to return to health. 
 
[Chart 19:  NPL Totals] 
 
At a higher level of abstraction, it is clear that Japan's banks were caught between 
macroeconomic exigency on the one side and political realities on the other.  The country needed 
more aggregate demand in order not to fall into prolonged recession.  Deregulation and 
restructuring might have caused consumption to strengthen in a manner which lowered the 
savings rate somewhat and, to that extent, reduced the need for extraordinary stimulus.  But 
thorough reform never occurred because too many corporate executives, bank managers, 
regulators, and politicians feared the ramifications of such change for the economy as a whole 
and for their own particular interests.  The requisite incremental demand might also have 
stemmed from growth in the current account surplus, yet this too failed to materialize.   By 
default, then, the country remained dependent on inordinate corporate investment.  It was only 
possible to engage in this copious capital spending, however, as long as the banks kept supplying 
capital to the weaker industries that comprised so much of Japan’s surfeit productive capacity.  
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When those industries subsequently performed poorly—as they almost invariably did—they 
transferred a large proportion of their losses to the financial system in the form of new NPLs.  
Some regulators and political leaders recognized this destructive dynamic and professed a desire 
to obviate it, but these people were always in a distinct minority and could not marshal much 
political support for their views.  A dysfunctional financial system consequently became part of 
the complex of problems that the leaders of 1990s Japan left for their successors to resolve.  
 
 
Part Five: Raiding the Treasury 
 
Although corporate investment, financed in the main through bank loans, helped sustain 
aggregate demand throughout the 1990s, its ability to serve this function diminished over time.  
There was a modest fall in household savings during the decade; but corporations were 
conversely becoming more parsimonious, and this meant that the combined savings rate stayed 
very high.  In the meantime, though, the ratio of capital expenditures to GDP fell from just over 
19% in 1990 and 1991 towards 15% in 1999.  The gap between aggregate supply and aggregate 
demand accordingly widened, portending commercial stagnation at best and economic 
contraction at worst.  In order to avoid such an outcome Japan must find yet another source of 
supplemental demand.  Ultimately it would be the government which filled this gap, increasing 
its deficit spending so ambitiously that it not only counteracted the decrease in corporate 
investment but also produced some impetus toward economic expansion.  This, incidentally, is 
how Japan managed to grow during the 1990s rather than stagnating or falling into depression.  
But the progressively greater reliance on fiscal stimulus was by no means a cost-free proposition:  
by the turn of the decade the national debt, too, would have begun to cast a shadow over Japan’s 
future. 
 
Before describing Tokyo’s fiscal policy and its shortcomings, it may be useful to explain in more 
detail why the external alternative was never earnestly pursued. The excess of savings over 
investment that afflicted Japan from the 1980s through the end of the century meant that a 
weaker yen and a bigger current account surplus were the most appropriate means of bolstering 
aggregate demand.  Put simply, the exchange rate should have fallen so as to enable the country 
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to export its surplus capital.  The price deflation which characterized the decade of the 1990s 
underscored the potential advantages of depreciation, for a weaker yen might also have 
engendered inflationary pressures and have slowed the pace at which NPLs were appearing on 
the banks’ balance sheets.  Depreciation and greater capital outflows would also have helped 
some members of the international community; for these were the years in which the newly 
independent peoples of East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union were competing with 
other poor nations for scarce investment funds, and anything which lowered global interest rates 
would have facilitated their economic modernization.89  East Asia and the world would also have 
benefited if a new exchange rate had stabilized the Japanese economy and transformed it from a 
source of deflation and financial risk into an engine of growth. 
 
Yet however persuasive the arguments in favor of a cheaper yen, there were equally convincing 
reasons to believe that such an expedient was impracticable.  The first of these was the sheer size 
of the necessary change.  Through much of the 1990s potential net savings in the private sector, 
calculated as the residual that would have resulted if corporations had invested at the same rate 
as their US and German counterparts and the government budget had been balanced, totaled 
somewhere near a tenth of GDP.  The current account surplus, though, was only 3.1% of national 
output in 1993.90  In order to employ all of the country's extra capital, then, Japan’s external 
surplus might conceivably have needed to triple in size. Singapore and Switzerland have 
exported a tenth of their GDP in excess funds each year over long stretches of time, but they 
represented such small parts of the international economy that this posed little challenge to other 
countries.  Japan, by contrast, was so massive that an attempt to reconcile its aggregate supply 
and demand through the current account would have fundamentally altered the international 
pattern of trade and finance and have imposed wrenching change on other countries’ domestic 
institutions.   
 
It was understandable, therefore, that few foreign governments were willing to contemplate 
anything more than a small adjustment in the yen’s value.  To adduce the most salient example, 
in the early 1990s Washington shared Tokyo’s view that Japan’s structural flaws were not severe 
                                                 
89 The IMF’s argument to this effect is summarized in Brown, pp. 70,132.  
90 Statistical Yearbook, pp. 138,423. Martin Wolf, in Financial Times, 9 May 2001. Brown, pp. 75-79,164,169. 
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and could soon, and easily, be overcome.  Confident in this respect, the United States 
concentrated its diplomacy on trying to prize open Japan’s various markets as a means of 
reducing the size of its own trade deficit.91  During these years the Clinton administration also 
enacted several concrete policies which had the effect of inhibiting growth in Japan’s net 
exports.  The tightening of fiscal policy during the 1990s was one such measure, for it lowered 
interest rates within the United States and stopped the dollar from rising against the yen as much 
as it would otherwise have done.92  That these initiatives might push Japan into a depression was 
a possibility which, at this stage, worried almost no one in the US capital.  Thus the Americans 
initially welcomed the steep appreciation of the yen between 1991 and 1995, when the currency 
briefly touched ¥80 per dollar, before belatedly realizing that this was crippling the Japanese 
economy and retarding world growth. 
   
Japan’s neighbors in East and Southeast Asia shared the US opposition to a weaker yen, for such 
a development would have constrained their ability to export goods and services while also 
harming those domestic enterprises that competed with Japanese imports.  Concern on this score 
intensified during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and reached a climax when the yen 
plummeted to ¥147 per dollar in 1998.  Much of East Asia, the United States, and a few 
European countries complained vociferously about this depreciation, claiming with some 
justification that it was exacerbating the region’s travails.93  The costs of this international 
opprobrium were significant.  By the summer of 1998 many officials in Washington had 
concluded that Tokyo was no longer a reliable diplomatic ally and that the United States should 
start treating Beijing as its foremost “strategic partner” in the western Pacific.94  President Bill 
Clinton’s decision to fly to China for a state visit without making the customary courtesy call on 
the Japanese government was just the most public sign of the White House’s disillusionment 
with its old ally.  In these circumstances there was little chance of Japan’s making progress 
towards such cherished goals as a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. 
 
                                                 
91 Bergsten et al., pp. 15-8,100.  Brown, pp. 59,131,157,166-7,186,194-6,200. 
92 Ibid., pp. 76,169. Bergsten et al., p. 46. 
93 Ibid., pp. 97,100,199.  EIU, Japan Country Report, 2nd Quarter 1998, pp. 15-6; and 3rd Quarter 1998, pp. 17-8. 
94 Ibid., 1st Quarter 1999, pp. 16-7. 
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Some economists and Japanese politicians have contended on these grounds that outsiders were 
responsible for the strength of the yen in the 1990s—and even for the two recessions that befell 
the country during that decade. 95  This argument, though, is spurious.  If the Ministry of Finance 
and the Bank of Japan had acted assertively they could almost certainly have devalued the yen no 
matter what other countries thought.  The monetary authorities, after all, controlled their own 
printing presses and could issue as much yen, and purchase as much foreign currency, as they 
wished.  The MOF would in fact use this power over exchange rates, which it retained after the 
BOJ gained statutory independence in April 1998, quite effectively in the first half of 2003.  
During those months the US dollar weakened considerably, and the ministry reacted by 
intervening to drive the yen down in tandem, thereby keeping the yen-dollar exchange rate fairly 
stable but improving Japan’s terms of trade relative to the European Union and many other 
economies.96  The success of this endeavor belied the notion that in the 1990s Japan had sat 
impotently by as foreign recalcitrance forced the yen to move ineluctably upward.  Also 
discredited in early 2003 was the erroneous proposition that monetary policy becomes irrelevant 
once a country’s interest rates have fallen to zero, for the higher cost of imports entailed by the 
MOF’s currency intervention played some role in the deceleration of Japan’s price deflation 
which ensued towards the end of that year.  The truth is that like any other country Japan was 
perfectly capable of debasing its own money. 
 
Hence the question is not whether Japan could have weakened the yen enough to make its 
current account surplus expand but rather why it chose not to do so.  Surprisingly, perhaps, for 
most of the period from 1985 through 2000 the balance of opinion in Tokyo favored the status 
quo or a slight cheapening of the yen but never dramatic depreciation of the sort that would have 
contributed substantially to aggregate demand.  Both BOJ Governor Yasushi Mieno in the early 
1990s and, after a brief interim, Governor Masaru Hayami in the late 1990s felt that a robust 
currency was beneficial to Japan insofar as it compelled companies to cut costs and achieve 
                                                 
95 Eisuke Sakakibara, "US-Japanese Economic Policy Conflicts and Coordination during the 1990s", in Posen and 
Mikitani, pp 167-185. Perhaps the most rigorous exposition of this theory is Ronald I. McKinnon and Kenichi Ohno, 
Dollar and Yen (Boston, Massachusetts:  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997). 
96 Whereas the Euro appreciated by almost 30% against the dollar, the yen gained only about 10%.  The net effect on 
Japan’s overall terms of trade was basically neutral.  Financial Times, 24 June 2003. NikkeiNet, 13 May 2003, 26 
May 2003, and 9 June 2003. The scale of this intervention diminished in late 2003 and stopped, at least temporarily, 
in March 2004.  This change reflected the fact that the dollar was now strengthening against the yen.  Goldman 
Sachs, Japan Economics Analyst, 14 May 2004. 
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greater efficiencies.  The record is replete with their statements in this regard, and the governors 
generally acted in a manner consonant with their convictions.97  From time to time other parts of 
the civil service expressed a similar preference for tight monetary policy and a comparatively 
high exchange rate.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was one such institution; it was happy to 
see Japanese corporations take advantage of the strong yen to invest in Asia because that 
investment enhanced Tokyo’s influence in the region.  Meanwhile, ranking officials in both 
MITI and the MOF occasionally advocated appreciation as a means of placating the importunate 
Americans without having to liberalize Japan’s domestic economy.98  The MOF’s behavior 
changed somewhat after it ceded control of monetary policy to the BOJ in 1998.  Now the 
ministry more consistently advocated marginal depreciation as a means of assisting the country’s 
exporters, and yet it still acted as if engineering the yen’s fall were the central bank’s duty rather 
than using its own statutory powers to affect the exchange market.   Even worse, by this point the 
MOF’s calls for looser monetary policy had become counterproductive because Governor 
Hayami was determined to defend the central bank’s new autonomy from political interference.99   
Thus there was no extended period of time during the 1990s during which the relevant parts of 
the civil service uniformly favored an exchange rate low enough to enable Japan to reach 
macroeconomic balance. 
  
Strong political leadership might have overcome this bureaucratic impasse.  The Diet could at 
any time have passed a law dictating that the MOF and the BOJ to devalue the yen in order to 
enlarge the current account or, alternatively, to combat deflation.  The Liberal Democrats, 
however, were never sufficiently dissatisfied with the status quo to insist on such a radical 
departure.  For although the prospect of a moderately weaker currency and somewhat faster GDP 
                                                 
97 For example, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 30 December 1989; Reuters, 27 November 1991; Jiji Newswire, 27 April 
1992; Reuters, 2 November 1994; Nikkei Weekly, 23 March 1998; Wall Street Journal, 6 April 1998; Nihon Keizai 
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98 See, in particular, press statements by the MOF’s Sakakibara, who espoused yen strength in a way that belies his 
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important not only because they endorsed the BOJ’s policies but also because they altered the balance of risks as 
perceived by market participants.  At many times during the 1990s investors were tempted to short the currency but 
feared that the government might later intervene to push its value up.  To avoid the losses this would entail, they 
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6,118-9,145,155,162,180-3. 
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growth doubtless appealed to these politicians, their highest priority was protecting those interest 
groups that were essential to their own political power.  If they thought about the matter at all, 
therefore, they would probably have objected to precipitous depreciation to the degree that it 
hamstrung their friends in import-dependent industries, such as energy production and retail and 
wholesale distribution, and because it might provoke Japan’s trading partners into imposing 
restraints on the country’s exports.100  Many LDP parliamentarians presumably also worried 
about the opinions of voters, many of whom would have objected if a lower exchange rate 
diminished the purchasing power of their savings or further tarnished Japan’s international 
prestige.  For these reasons the path of least resistance for the ruling party was to let the MOF 
and the BOJ pursue what was in reality a strong yen policy. 
 
[Chart 20:  Investment vs. Government] 
 
Since the external surplus was never allowed to widen enough to alleviate Japan’s deflationary 
tendencies, fiscal policy became the key to the country’s economic stability. The extent to which 
the government supplemented private demand may be seen in the trajectory of the national 
budget, which moved from an average annual surplus of 1.8% of GDP in the years 1989-1991, to 
a deficit of 2.4% in 1993, and thence gradually to a deficit of 7.1% in 1999.101  As these figures 
imply, fiscal spending added almost a tenth to yearly economic output over the course of the 
decade.  This more than compensated for the decline in private non-residential investment and 
helped Japan eke out GDP growth of some 1.0% per annum rather than succumbing to a lengthy 
recession or depression.  Such was no mean accomplishment given the deflationary forces that 
prevailed in the aftermath of the bubble’s implosion.  
   
Tokyo’s use of its budget to fend off economic contraction was in fact so effective as to cast 
doubt on one of the three major criticisms leveled against its fiscal policy during the 1990s.  That 
first argument—that the government might have revivified the economy at almost any time had it 
opted for a sharp burst of fiscal stimulus, or “pump priming”, rather than slowly increasing the 
size of the deficit—emanated regularly from officials in the US government and from some 
                                                                                                                                                             
99 Kashyap, “Discussion”, pp. 112-3. 
100 Brown, pp.  127-8,131,157,166-7,184,186,192-6,200. 
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corporate analysts and academic researchers.102   These people believed that conditions in the 
Japanese economy were fundamentally sound in the late 1980s and that it was cyclical factors 
that, at the turn of the decade, pushed aggregate demand temporarily below aggregate supply.  
To close this gap the government should have immediately adopted a program of generous tax 
cuts and well-conceived public works projects in order to stimulate household consumption and 
corporate investment.  The economy would then have resumed the high rate of growth that it had 
attained before the bubble collapsed.  An ordinary ailment, in other words, called for an ordinary 
cure. 
 
The errors informing this view are numerous.  Most conspicuously, Japan’s problems were not 
cyclical but structural.  If the economy had been fundamentally healthy, its productivity and 
profitability would not have declined so inexorably from the 1970s through the 1990s.  Nor 
would the “dualistic” bias in the country’s industrial system, whereby an extremely competitive 
export sector indirectly subsidized a much larger and less efficient domestic sector, have grown 
more deeply entrenched with the passage of time.  But these deleterious trends were 
demonstrably, measurably, real.  Their presence attested to the existence of flaws which were 
both profound and chronic.   
 
Equally undeniable was the related phenomenon of a very high private savings rate, a feature 
which was more typical of a developing country with a low standard of living than of a mature 
economy and which caused such immense trouble during the 1990s.  What Japan required was to 
find a new equilibrium in which some combination of households, government, and foreigners 
consistently provided more aggregate demand, leaving fewer surplus funds to discourage 
commerce and push prices down.  Isolated doses of deficit spending, no matter how voluminous, 
could not produce such a result.  They could absorb excess capital and add to aggregate demand 
in the short term, yielding some GDP growth in any one- or two-year period, but as soon as the 
stimulus had dissipated the weight of superfluous savings would again cause commercial activity 
to recede.  This is why fiscal schemes like those enacted in 1995-1996 and 1998-1999, which 
many of the cyclical enthusiasts initially declared sufficient to trigger a self-sustaining recovery, 
                                                                                                                                                             
101 EIU, CountryData, 2001.   
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failed in the event to do so.103  It was only when many such packages were superimposed one 
upon another, steadily expanding the budget deficit and replacing the incremental loss of 
corporate investment, that even negligible economic growth became possible over longer periods 
of time. 
 
A related flaw in the cyclical theory is its declared expectation that fiscal stimulus would revive 
the economy by engendering greater capital spending as well as more consumption.  For 
although stronger consumption would definitely have helped Japan, the last thing the country 
needed in the 1990s was for companies to amass more plant and equipment.  Isolated industries 
such as high technology or healthcare might ideally have added to their productive capacity, but 
this should have occurred in the context of decreasing overall investment as Japan finally 
converged toward the pattern that characterized the United States, Germany, and other mature 
economies.  In the meantime, the establishment of another domestic automobile factory, the 
opening of another unprofitable retail outlet, or the incorporation of one more construction firm 
could not possibly have improved the efficiency of the economy.   Quite the opposite: such 
efforts would have lowered the rates of return available to households, pension funds, and other 
investors, and hence have fostered a higher savings rate over the medium and long term.  It is 
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hard to imagine a development more inimical to the wellbeing of a country that was already 
suffering from inadequate aggregate demand. 
 
The second major objection to Japan’s fiscal policy was that it did not promote restructuring of 
the sort which might have shifted the balance of economic activity away from corporate 
investment and towards consumption.  This argument appears more cogent.  There were limits to 
the efficacy of such reforms, for a nation with so many middle-aged people was likely to persist 
in accumulating wealth under almost any conditions.  But as witnessed by the modest fall in the 
household savings rate during the bubble period, workers and individual investors were not 
altogether insensitive to changes in company profitability.  It should accordingly have been 
possible to make some progress if, for instance, the government had thoroughly reformed the 
banks, shut off the supply of credit to poorly performing enterprises, and raised the standard of 
corporate governance so that labor and capital were allocated more appropriately.  Such a 
process would assuredly have been traumatic in the short term, as marginal corporations failed 
and the ranks of the unemployed swelled; but the government could alleviate some of this stress 
through tax cuts, the extension of better welfare benefits, and moderately inflationary monetary 
policy.  When the reforms reached fruition in a higher rate of GDP growth and better returns on 
investments, households would presumably feel richer and curtail their savings just as they had 
done in the heady days of the late 1980s.  The surfeit funds that must be exported through a 
larger current account surplus or absorbed by government budget deficits would then diminish, 
and Japan’s future would look commensurately brighter. 
  
Regrettably, more often than not the government tried to preclude meaningful restructuring 
rather than to encourage it.  This was evident in the pressures applied to Nissan Motor 
Corporation in 1993 and 1994, when politicians proved more reactionary than organized labor, 
and in the regulators' attitude toward the country’s dysfunctional banks throughout the decade.  
The same conservative emphasis informed the Obuchi cabinet's provision of almost ¥1 trillion in 
consumption vouchers to households in the years 1998-1999, supposedly the peak of reformist 
fervor, for this largesse was intended in part to ease the financial stresses under which inefficient 
"mom-and-pop" operations were laboring so that they would continue to assist the LDP and New 
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Komeito in national elections.104  Prime Minister Obuchi's simultaneous extension of ¥30 trillion 
in loan guarantees to small and medium-sized corporations was likewise designed to prevent the 
collapse of uncompetitive enterprises that were sympathetic to the ruling coalition.  The import 
of these initiatives, however, was to leave the state in the unenviable position of underwriting 
loans to companies that even Japan’s reckless bankers considered unduly risky. Still another 
policy designed to slow the reallocation of resources was the apparent decision, in the aftermath 
of Shinsei Bank’s privatization, not to let foreigners gain control of another big lender.  In 
keeping with this new policy, in 2000 the government sold NCB to a predominantly Japanese 
consortium despite the fact that that group had much less expertise in corporate rehabilitation and 
was offering $540 million less than the highest Western bidder.105  In all these cases the 
authorities acted to shield vested interests from the winds of change rather than letting market 
forces rationalize the economy. 
 
Yet the most egregious example of suboptimal fiscal spending—judged, again, from an 
economic vantage point as opposed to a political perspective—was the bounty bestowed on the 
construction industry.  By the late 1980s Japan had a very large stock of factories, office 
buildings, houses, and apartments, so the private sector’s appetite for new construction would 
probably have waned even if asset prices had not subsequently collapsed.  But collapse they did, 
and so consecutively did industry demand.  Private orders to the 50 largest builders decreased 
from ¥19.2 trillion in 1990 to ¥9.6 trillion in 1999, and this drove their ROE down from 26.2% to 
11.3%.106  The only way to reverse this financial decline would have been to shut down 
superfluous companies and lay off redundant workers until total capacity fell to a level consistent 
with market demand.  But rather than shrink, the sector actually expanded.  The percentage of 
the workforce employed there rose from 9.1% at the beginning of the decade to 10.1% at its end, 
and the number of firms in the industry rose even faster.107  By the latter date some experts 
would reckon that half of the builders’ productive capacity was excess.  
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[Chart 21:  FILP Growth] 
       
Such prodigious overcapacity could not have been maintained at a time of flagging household 
and corporate demand without significant assistance from the Japanese government.  Given the 
importance of the building companies to the LDP’s political fortunes, however, there was never 
much doubt that such help would be forthcoming.  Each year the Liberal Democrats ensured that 
the government’s regular budgets included big dollops of cash for public works projects.  When 
public scrutiny and opposition from fiscally conservative officials in the MOF prevented the 
ruling party from being as generous in this regard as it wished, it adopted less transparent 
expedients.   The aforementioned Fiscal Investment and Loan Program was one such 
mechanism.  It grew enormously during the period in question, from ¥20.5 trillion in 1985, to 
¥35.8 trillion in 1990, and then to ¥52.9 trillion in 1999.108  Since approximately one-third of the 
FILP’s yearly expenditures were devoted to infrastructure development, this expansion entailed a 
vast increase in official support for construction companies.109   
 
Still another channel for public subsidies was the government’s supplementary budgets.  At 
several points during the decade it became clear that economic activity was slowing, and the 
political leadership in Tokyo reacted by formulating stimulus packages that were expected 
primarily to precipitate GDP growth but secondarily to protect Japan’s myriad construction 
firms.   This latter motive is reflected in the composition of the fiscal schemes.110  Whereas well-
designed tax cuts might have fostered corporate restructuring and hence have strengthened 
consumption, such items accounted for only 13% of the fiscal stimulus as compared to 42% for 
expenditures on infrastructure.  Over the course of the decade these supplementary packages 
added more than ¥25 trillion to the public works provisions of the original annual budgets.111 
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Finally, the ruling party also used commercial banking system to sustain the builders.  Small, and 
burdened by considerable excess capacity, many of these corporations were constantly losing 
money and generating NPLs for their creditors to absorb and should, therefore, have been forced 
into bankruptcy.  But the regulators and senior Liberal Democrats did not want this to happen, so 
they quietly encouraged Japan’s lenders to continue supplying capital to them.112  What the 
authorities feared most, after all, was not destabilizing the financial system or wrecking the 
government’s finances but losing the pecuniary and logistical advantages on which their power 
was predicated.  
 
[Chart 22:  Stimulus Packages] 
 
The third and most persuasive criticism of Japanese fiscal policy during the 1990s was that it 
endangered the country’s long-term financial stability.   The government began the decade with 
what was by global standards a low level of national debt and a sizeable budget surplus.  This 
was an important fact; it meant that Japan had the wherewithal to use aggressive tax cuts and 
sagacious spending programs to neutralize the contractile effects of the industrial restructuring 
that was essential to lowering the corporate and household savings rates.  But Tokyo opted to use 
its resources to preserve, rather than to change, the country’s economic system.  This strategy 
was not without macroeconomic merit—once again, the gradual enlargement of the government 
deficit soaked up surplus funds and forestalled a protracted fall in GDP—but it left the economy 
largely unreconstructed, constrained by inadequate aggregate demand, and needing still more 
extraordinary stimulus.  As a consequence the budget deficit grew ever larger and the national 
debt, measured in the more appropriate gross terms, climbed from a respectable 65% of GDP in 
1990, to 124% of that standard in 2000, and to even greater heights in the following years.113   
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Such indebtedness did not pose any insuperable difficulties during this period, when interest 
rates were exceptionally low and the government could easily float new bond issues.  But if the 
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to offset large portions of the gross national debt, this approach suffers from three important shortcomings.  First, 
between 1990 and 2003 the government’s total indebtedness increased from ¥300.1 trillion to ¥771 trillion.  EIU, 
CountryData, 2004.  It follows from this that both its gross and its net positions deteriorated significantly over that 
period.  The incremental increase in Japan’s borrowing—nearly a year’s GDP—is in fact bigger than the entire net 
debt as reckoned by the IMF, Broda and Weinstein, and many other economists.   
Second, until the government redeems its outstanding JGBs it must pay the interest on them and remains 
liable for their principle. In this sense the concept of net debt is irrelevant.  The government could not, for instance, 
default on the 41% of the outstanding JGBs owned by private institutions without harming those institutions, 
damaging the economy, and infuriating the electorate (BOJ, Flow of Funds data).  Nor could the authorities renege 
on the 29% of the JGBS that are owned by the postal savings, postal insurance, and public pension systems, for 
these agencies likewise derive their funds from individual and household depositors.  There may in theory be more 
flexibility with regard to the 13% of the debt held by public financial institutions and the 15% owned by the Bank of 
Japan, but the private sector would presumably react negatively to any indication that the government intended to 
cancel some or all of its financial obligations.  Such an announcement could in fact trigger a sell-off that pushed up 
yields and render it more difficult for the country to service its remaining debt.  In practical terms, therefore, Japan 
will remain saddled with considerable financial obligations, and hence vulnerable to changes in interest rates, until it 
actually retires a meaningful volume of the outstanding JGBs. 
Third, most calculations of Japan’s net debt are not really “net” at all.  The statisticians diligently identify 
and subtract the value of concealed and off-balance sheet assets from the gross national debt, but they do not ask 
whether those assets are liquid:  whether, that is, they can be sold for all, most, or any of their supposed worth.  This 
omission leads to a substantial overstatement of the value of the government’s portfolio and hence of its net worth.  
Equally problematic is those analysts’ failure, after reducing the gross debt by subtracting the government’s assets, 
to add back the government’s hidden liabilities. One category of ignored losses is those in the FILP system, which 
one recent estimate put at nearly 20% of GDP. Takero Doi and Takeo Hoshi, “Paying for the FILP”, NBER 
Working Paper #9385, 2002. Other government accounts also contain significant unacknowledged losses, which 
tend to be overlooked because they are difficult to quantify.  Advocates of net figures also tend to neglect the 
probability that the government will be called upon to absorb losses incurred by Japan’s regional banks and it’s 
many troubled insurance companies.  Less obvious still are the contingent liabilities in Japan’s various pension 
schemes.  Purists observe that these shortfalls should not be considered current debt because they have not yet 
accrued.  This view is certainly valid with respect to the present, but it becomes less compelling if one is trying to 
predict the government’s future financial condition.  The deficiency in the public pension system is projected to total 
some ¥450 trillion (Wall Street Journal, 24 May 2004. NikkeiNet, 23 April 2004), and that of the private schemes is 
expected to reach ¥530 trillion (IMF calculations, summarized in EIU, Japan Country Report, March 2004, p. 18).  
The government could renege on its commitments, and allow the underfunded private pension systems to do the 
same, but this would have a profoundly negative impact on household confidence, economic growth, and public 
support for the elected authorities.  For these reasons it seems logical to assume that the political leadership will 
ultimately strike a compromise, providing some proportion of the payouts promised to retirees by both public and 
private institutions.  That compromise, in turn, will suddenly push the net debt figures substantially upwards.  
Accurately predicting Japan’s financial trajectory over the few decades therefore requires that one estimate the 
timing and magnitude of the pension burden’s materialization and then add that number—which could easily be as 
much as a year’s GDP—to the net debt projections.   If this is deemed too complex a task to accomplish with any 
precision, then a second-best solution is to use the gross national debt as a crude, ballpark means of estimating 
Japan’s future financial position. 
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country’s debt mounted much further the cost of financing it might eventually exceed the 
revenues that the state could derive from even a reformed and relatively vigorous economy.  
 
Though subject to the caveat that economic prognostication is always an imprecise art, medium-
term simulations undertaken by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) convey some sense of the 
impending challenge.114   In that group’s baseline scenario the pace of growth in Japanese GDP 
peaks well above 3% in 2004 and then recedes to the country’s medium-term potential rate of 
some 1% from 2007 onwards.115  Because the prices of goods and services are now beginning to 
rise, the average real interest rate on outstanding Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) falls from 
1.0% to 0.4% over the forecast period, which implies that the cost of financing the national debt 
declines even though the government is borrowing ever more money.  Also beneficial is a big 
increase in annual sales of state assets, such as stakes in railroads and other corporations, in order 
to garner more revenue.  Yet despite this combination of economic growth, lower interest 
expenses, and enhanced revenues, the budget deficit widens from 7.4% of GDP in 2003 to 8.5% 
thereof in 2008.  Even worse, the gross national debt grows from 155% to 208% of GDP, leaving 
Japan much more vulnerable to domestic and international shocks than it is today. 
 
The alternative scenario posits a moderate degree of fiscal tightening and yields a slightly less 
tenebrous conclusion.  In this simulation the government raises the consumption tax from its 
present level of 5% to 7% in 2007, when it likewise begins imposing a series of annual increases 
in the income tax.  These assumptions are in fact quite generous.  Cognizant that a similar rise in 
the consumption duty in 1997 so offended voters that they forced then-Prime Minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto to resign from office, today’s Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has pledged that the 
LDP will refrain from enacting any changes in the relevant laws until 2007 at the earliest.116  
                                                 
114 The reform scenario may be found in EIU, Japan Country Forecast, June 2003. The rest of the results are 
unpublished.   
115 The IMF alternatively estimates that the potential rate in 2004-2005 is about 1% and assumes that comprehensive 
restructuring will overcome the negative effect of a shrinking labor force and produce a moderately higher trend 
growth rate in the latter half of this decade.  IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2004, p. 28; see also, pp. 3,10,12.  The 
Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER) believes that the potential rate could rise well above 1%, and perhaps 
towards 2%, by 2009; but only if comprehensive reforms are enacted and large numbers of women and retirees join 
the workforce, thereby relaxing the demographic constraint.  JCER, 30th Medium-Term Forecast of the Japanese 
Economy:  Fiscal Years 2003-2010, http://www.jcer.or.jp/eng/.  If any of these conditions fails to materialize, the 
JCER projections would fall back towards the EIU forecast. 
116 For Koizumi’s pledge, see:  NikkeiNet, 19 January 2004, 22 January 2004, and 9 April 2004. 
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Underscoring this cautious attitude is the fact that national elections to both the upper and lower 
houses of the Diet are scheduled for later that year.  Since it would be impolitic to start detailed 
discussions of tax reform until those polls are safely in the past, the earliest that new duties could 
realistically be levied is probably 2008 or 2009. But if one ignores these political considerations 
and initiates the retrenchment process in early 2007, as in the EIU exercise, the result is that the 
budget deficit stops widening and stabilizes at about 7.3% of GDP.  This represents an 
improvement over the baseline scenario but, with the debt-to-GDP ratio surpassing 200% in 
2008 and still growing at roughly the same speed as in 2003-2004, it is hardly cause for 
celebration.   Thus the reforms proposed in the EIU analysis prove to be but a modest first step in 
what must perforce be a long and arduous program of financial consolidation. 
 
[Chart 23:  Projected Budget Deficits] 
[Chart 24:  Projected National Debt (found on same worksheet as 23)] 
 
The situation is by no means hopeless.  By international standards Japan is taxed lightly: the state 
took an average of only 31% of GDP each year between 2000 and 2004, as opposed to almost 
40% for the members of the OECD and even more for several of the EU nations.117  This means 
that there should be plenty of room to expand government revenues in order to eliminate the 
budget deficit and begin paying down the national debt. This desirable outcome would be 
jeopardized, however, if Tokyo did not act decisively and at the right moment.  On the one hand 
it must not raise taxes before private-sector demand has strengthened and the output gap closed, 
for doing so would push the country back into recession and prolong the economy’s dependence 
on state stimulus.  The recovery of 2002-2004 has surely reduced that gap, but it will probably be 
another two or three years before the government may safely begin the process of aggressive 
fiscal retrenchment.  On the other hand, Tokyo cannot delay painful tax hikes far beyond the end 
of the present decade without letting the debt grow so large that the average interest rate on JGBs 
starts to rise and the pressures on the government budget intensify.  The temporal window within 
which to make the necessary adjustment may thus be fairly narrow.   
 
                                                 
117 EIU, CountryData, 2004. 
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Some commentators believe that Japan will easily negotiate these problems of timing and 
political judgment because “it seems hard to imagine the Japanese government” failing to act in 
the country’s best interests.118  Such optimism, however, is at variance with the history of 
political and regulatory behavior retailed in this paper; a history which unfortunately suggests 
that the authorities very well could postpone fiscal tightening until it is too late to contain the 
national debt.  The temptation to dither may in fact be growing more compelling as the electorate 
ages, for older and more conservative voters generally tend to oppose dramatic change of the sort 
Japan so conspicuously needs.  An eventual default on the national debt, either overtly or 
through a bout of rapid inflation, can therefore not be ruled out.119
 
With this in mind Japan’s fiscal policy in the 1990s was plainly suboptimal.  It is true that the 
increase in deficit spending neutralized the contraction in corporate investment, bolstered 
aggregate demand, and generated a modicum of GDP growth.  Put simply, the government 
succeeded in fending off depression.  But Tokyo exhibited its largesse in ways that preserved a 
severely distorted economic system in which corporations transferred too little wealth to workers 
and investors, the private-sector savings rate remained elevated, and the NPLs in the financial 
sector proliferated rapidly.  The price deflation which began in the latter half of the decade was 
both a symptom of this distortion and an aggravating factor in it, putting additional stress on the 
banks and necessitating still more deficit spending.120  Even worse, perhaps, this deflation 
depressed the interest rates that Tokyo was obliged to pay in order to borrow money from 
investors and hence rendered it easier for profligate Liberal Democrats and civil servants to 
persist in wasting valuable public resources.  Japan accordingly entered the 2000s largely 
unreformed, as reliant on fiscal stimulus as ever, and with the possibility of a debt crisis looming 
on the distant horizon. 
  
 
                                                 
118 Broda, et al., p. 32. 
119 A normal default occurs when a country cannot pay its foreign creditors and is forced to reschedule, or renege 
upon, its commitments.  But if the debt is held domestically and its interest rate is fixed, then a government need not 
admit that it is defaulting and can simply inflate away some of the debt’s real value. This option is available to 
Tokyo because the proportion of the JGBs held by Japanese entities is very high:  92.6% in 1999, and more 
thereafter.  OECD, Volume 2002, Supplement, No. 2, p. 62.  
120 Krugman, “ Respectability”, February 1999; and “The Land of the Rising Yen”, September 1999.  Also, Asian 




In the late 1980s and 1990s Japan suffered from what one writer has termed “the dilemma of the 
one-party state”.121  The LDP had dominated the nation’s politics for so long that it had become 
identified with a particular industrial and financial structure: it was quintessentially a party of the 
status quo.  The government was thus ill prepared to redress the imbalances that emerged in the 
middle 1980s.  By this point the economy had matured, and household consumption should have 
begun to replace corporate investment as a source of new aggregate demand.  This, however, did 
not happen. Demographic factors, poor corporate governance, official intransigence, and other 
forces prevented the private-sector savings rate from falling and thereby left Japan saddled with 
much more capital than it could reasonably expect to employ within its own borders.  This 
problem of excess savings could have been resolved through a much larger current account 
surplus, which would have shipped Japan’s excess funds abroad; through corporate restructuring, 
which would have lowered the savings rate; or through some combination of both.  The economy 
would then have moved towards a new and more stable equilibrium, and respectable GDP 
growth would have ensued. 
 
Yet these remedial possibilities were never seriously explored.  Misunderstanding played a role 
in this failure in the early 1990s, for these were years in which very few people in Japan or 
abroad appreciated the virulence of the country’s illness or perceived the urgency of the need for 
reform.  Later in the decade, however, it was largely self-interest on the part of the main 
economic actors which precluded a return to health.  The BOJ actually preferred a strong yen, 
which put it in de facto alliance with the United States and those other countries that adamantly 
opposed an increase in Japan’s current account surplus.  The MOF and the country’s elected 
governments occasionally expressed dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, but they never used 
their own powers to drive the value of the yen down far enough to reconcile the national savings 
rate with the requirements of full employment.   So the burden of adjustment fell squarely on 
Japan’s domestic economy.  But here, too, the major actors refused to act.  The Liberal 
Democrats, the civil service, business executives and bank managers all feared the ramifications 
                                                 
121 Mikitani, “The Facts”, p. 29.   
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of structural change and consequently refused to endorse a program of comprehensive reform.  
To the people who mattered, in short, the cure seemed worse than the disease. 
 
By default, then, Japan was compelled to find other, less appropriate, ways to instill vigor in its 
economy.   Part of the answer was excessive corporate investment.  During the bubble years 
companies had greatly increased their capital expenditures, and this absorbed much of the 
surplus capital and gave the economy substantial positive momentum.  In the early 1990s, 
however, firms began to curtail their investment and this forced the government to step in, 
expanding its budget deficit in order to compensate for the new corporate parsimony.   This 
gambit succeeded in forestalling depression, produced some GDP growth, and preserved the 
bastions of LDP power.  But it also pushed Japan closer to the shoals of financial trouble, for by 
the turn of the century the national debt was swelling so rapidly that an eventual financial crisis 
was no longer inconceivable.  In the meantime, the disappointments of the 1990s had eroded 
public confidence in the nation’s political leadership, the bureaucracy, and the business 
community—precisely the institutions that would be called upon to implement the corporate and 
fiscal reforms necessary to contain the national debt.  In this sense the legacy of the "lost decade" 
was to leave the country with significantly fewer resources with which to manage the challenges 
it will encounter in the late 2000s and 2010s.   
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